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MENTAL ILLNESS AND CRIMINAL COMMITMENT
IN MICHIGAN
By Grant H. Morris*
"A man said 'Thou tree!' The tree answered
with the same scorn:
'Thou man! Thou art greater than I only in
thy possibilities.' "
- Stephen Crane
1. INTRODUCTION

In 1969 the Michigan Legislature, in a one-line budget item,
appropriated funds to revise mental health statutes.' In order to
2
achieve that goal, in the spring of 1970 the Legislative Council
created the Michigan Legislative Committee to Revise the Mental
Health Statutes. Additionally, the Governor appointed a Commission on Mental Health Program and Statute Review. The Governor's Commission has been working with and through the staff of
the Legislative Committee in a joint effort to secure broad-based
bipartisan support for the legislative enactment of their ultimate
recommendations.
As Legal Counsel to the Legislative Committee, this writer
has examined the statutes dealing with criminal commitment and
maximum security confinement. Preliminary work on this subject
has been completed and has been submitted for discussion to the
Legislative Committee and the Governor's Commission in the
form of a working paper. This article is a modified and shortened
version of that paper. 3 The recommendations for statutory revision are, at this stage, personal recommendations only and have
not been accepted by the reviewing bodies.
This article concentrates on one vital issue: to what extent are
* Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law
School; Professor of Law in Psychiatry, Wayne State University School of Medicine;
Legal Counsel, Michigan Legislative Committee to Revise the Mental Health Statutes.
I No. 133, § I [1969] Mich. Pub. Acts.
2 The Legislative Council is a bipartisan fourteen-member group of Michigan legislative
leaders. The Council has responsibility for the legislative service bureau which assists in
the research and preparation of bills. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 4.313-4.321 (1967).
3 Portions of the working paper eliminated from this article consider such issues as the
appropriate standard for criminal responsibility, procedural safeguards necessary to assure
that criminal responsibility is properly determined, and the criteria and safeguards necessary to determine competency to stand trial.
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differences in treatment justified because of a mentally ill person's
"criminal" involvement. While the article is primarily concerned
with Michigan institutions and Michigan statutes, the discussion
and the solutions proposed are in many respects applicable to all
states of the Union. Not only must all states reevaluate their
policies toward criminal commitment of the mentally ill in light of
ever-changing medical and penal theory, but they must also consider the developing constitutional concepts in this area. These
constitutional issues are raised here only to the extent necessary
to alert the reader to possible objections to present custodial
policies in Michigan and other states; authoritative conclusions
have not been attempted.
It seems desirable at the outset to list certain principles which
represent progressive and rational guidelines for statutory change
in the area of criminal commitment of the mentally ill. They are:
(1) when a mentally ill, person is placed in a mental hospital or
mental ward, the underlying purpose of such placement is treatment of that person's illness, notwithstanding any "criminal order" status of the person; (2) security measures should not be
imposed on any mentally ill person unless there is a necessity for
such measures, as determined by the diagnosis and pathology of
the individual's mental condition, not by his "criminal order"
status; (3) even when security measures must be imposed on a
mental patient, the emphasis of the mental hospital should be on
treatment of the patient's mental condition, not on maintaining
security; and (4) security measures imposed on a mental patient
should be eliminated as soon as his improved mental condition
warrants.

II.

MENTALLY ILL EX-CONVICTS

Michigan law currently provides for the transfer of insane convicts from the various state prisons to Ionia State Hospital, 4 a
maximum security institution. If the criminal patient's insanity
continues after the expiration of his or her criminal sentence, an
application can be made to the Ionia County Probate Court "for
an order to retain such person in the hospital until he or she is

4 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.66 (1967). Ionia State Hospital is located in Ionia
County in northern Michigan. Ionia in the past has had several main categories of patients:
(I) mentally ill ex-convicts [See Section I1infra]; (2) dangerous civil patients who are
transferred to Ionia [See Section Ill infra]; (3) defendants who have been found incompetent to stand trial [See Section IV infra].; (4) defendants who have been acquitted by
reason of insanity [See Section V infra]; (5) criminal sexual psychopaths [See Section VI
infra]; and (6) mentally ill convicts [See Section VII infra].
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restored to reason." 5 After a hearing and determination of "insanity" the judge may order the person committed "to the department of mental health for treatment in an appropriate state hospital . . . . "6 The statute also provides that the insane convict whose
sentence has expired can be paroled by the medical superintendent and entrusted to his friends or relatives.
The United States Supreme Court discussed the constitutional
problems of a similar New York statute 7 dealing with mentally ill
ex-convicts in Baxstrom v. Herold.8 In New York if a convict
became mentally ill while serving his sentence in prison, he was
transferred to Dannemora State Hospital, a maximum security
institution administered by the New York Department of Correction. The New York statute provided that upon expiration of his
sentence, the now mentally ill ex-convict was to be committed to
the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene and placed
in an appropriate institution in the Department of Mental Hygiene
or the Department of Correction. Placement in a Department of
Correction maximum security institution was "appropriate" only
if the ex-convict was dangerous and in need of maximum security
confinement. Johnnie K. Baxstrom was a mentally ill convict who
had been transferred from prison to Dannemora during his sentence. Upon expiration of that sentence and in accordance with
the statute, the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene designated
Danneffnora as the appropriate institution for Baxstrom's continued confinement. Subsequently, Baxstrom sought a writ of habeas
corpus. In holding that Baxstrom had been denied equal protection of the laws in contravention of the fourteenth amendment, the
Supreme Court reasoned that although New York law deemed
commitment pursuant to the statute a civil commitment, the statutory procedure authorizing the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene
to commit Baxstrom denied him the possibility of a jury review of
the propriety of his commitment, a right which was available to all
other persons civilly committed in New York. Additionally, the
Court held that by authorizing the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene to order Baxstrom confined in an institution maintained by
the Department of Correction, the statute deprived Baxstrom of a
judicial hearing to determine whether he was dangerously men5 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.68 (1967).
6 According to the April 7, 1970 census of Ionia State Hospital, seventy-two patients

are confined in that institution pursuant to MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.68 (1967).
Unless otherwise indicated all subsequent references to patient population will be based on
the7 April 7, 1970 census.
Ch. 540, § 4, [1965] N.Y. LAWS.
8383 U.S. 107 (1966).
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tally ill. Under New York law, a civil patient could not be transferred from a civil hospital to a Department of Correction maximum security mental institution unless he was first judicially
determined to be dangerously mentally ill? The statute in issue
unconstitutionally circumvented this procedural safeguard. 10
There are differences between the New York and Michigan
situations such that the specific holding of Baxstrom does not
necessarily apply to Michigan. First, in Michigan both the regional mental hospitals and the maximum security hospital (Ionia) are
within the jurisdiction of the Michigan Department of Mental
Health. There is no bifurcation of administrative responsibility as
in New York. Second, mental patients at the various regional
hospitals are not now statutorily entitled to a judicial hearing prior
to their transfer into Ionia. 1
However, the issue is not whether the Michigan statute would
be constitutionally defensible if it were subjected to judicial scrutiny, but whether the statute should be altered to avoid such
potential confrontation by conforming to the thrust of the Supreme Court opinion. In Baxstrom, the Court was concerned not
only with the specifics of a New York statute, but also with the
question of whether a mentally ill individual whose prison sentence has expired and whose debt to society has been paid is
entitled to be treated equally with all other nonconvict mentally ill
persons. By holding that Baxstrom had been denied equal protection of the laws, the Court answered this question with an emphatic "yes."
Although recent statutory amendments indicate that Ionia may
someday become a regional mental hospital, that goal has not yet
been reached. No state district has been assigned to the Ionia
State Hospital, and the Department of Mental Health continues
to use it solely as a maximum security hospital.
In light of Baxstrom the Michigan statute 12 should be amended
to the extent that it treats mentally ill ex-convicts as a unique
category of mentally ill persons and to the extent that it does not
9 N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 85 (McKinney 1971).
10 The Baxstrom decision resulted in the transfer and/ordischarge of 992 patients from

the maximum security hospitals in New York.
11MicH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. §330.67 (1967). The recent case of Dixon v. Attorney
General, 325 F.Supp. 966 (N.D. Pa. 1971) supports the contention that Baxstrom v.
Herold is relevant to the Michigan situation. Farview State Hospital, Pennsylvania's
maximum security hospital, is within the jurisdiction of the Department of Public Welfare,
as are the state's other mental hospitals. Nevertheless, the federal district court in Dixon,
relying onBaxstrom, held that the Pennsylvania statute permitting continued confinement
of ex-convicts in Farview upon expiration of their criminal sentences was unconstitutional.
12MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 330.68 (1967).
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differentiate Ionia State Hospital from the regional hospitals.
Specifically: (1) if an ex-convict is to be confined as a mentally ill
person at the expiration of his term of imprisonment, the probate
court ordering the confinement should be the court of the county
of the person's residence as provided for other mentally ill persons, rather than the Ionia County Probate Court; (2) the involuntarily committed ex-convict should be confined initially in
the regional hospital that services his place of residence (as is the
rule for other mentally ill persons) rather than Ionia; (3)
ex-convict mental patients should be transferred to Ionia only if
they meet the statutory criteria for transfer established for other
civil mental patients; (4) ex-convict mental patients should be
released from hospitalization in accordance with release procedures established for nonconvict mental patients. For example, a
Michigan statute provides for discharge of civil mental patients
who have been on convalescent status for the period of time
specified by the medical superintendent.13 The statute 14 dealing
with ex-convict mental patients contains no similar discharge provision.
III.

DANGEROUS CIVIL PATIENTS

A. Administrative Placement of DangerousPatients
A Michigan statute1 5 provides that the superintendent of any
regional hospital may transfer to Ionia State Hospital any mental
patient who has been guilty of an act of homicide prior to admission to the hospital or while under treatment in the hospital.
Similarly, the superintendent may transfer to Ionia any patient
who "develops unmistakable dangerous or homicidal tendencies."' 1 6 The statute permits the Department of Mental Health to
administrativelydetermine whether a patient has developed "unmistakable dangerous or homicidal tendencies" sufficient to permit transfer from the regional hospital to Ionia. In essence, the
statute treats Ionia as just another mental hospital; clearly it is
not. While the statute may provide the Michigan Department of
Mental Health with desired flexibility, the legislation cannot be
17
justified solely on that ground.
'3MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.35 (1) (1967).
14 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.68 (1967).

"5 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.67 (1967).
16Sixty patients in this category are confined in Ionia.
17A Department of Mental Health task force on statutes recommended that
[Probate Court] commitments be made to the Department of Mental-Health
rather than to a specific state hospital. The Department would then deter-
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The New York experience after the Baxstrom decision illustrates the dangers inherent in the administrative placement of
mental patients into maximum security confinement. The Supreme Court's decision in Baxstrom did not result in the immediate discharge of a single patient from New York's maximum
security hospitals (Dannemora and Matteawan) directly into
society. Rather, the New York Department of Mental Hygiene
"transferred" to civil (regional) hospitals all ex-prisoners whose
sentences had expired and who were being held in maximum
security confinement pursuant to the unconstitutional statute.
This process was called "Operation Baxstrom." After one year,
the New York Department of Mental Hygiene reported:
The most striking news is that there is no news. None of
the hospitals has any particular problems to report. The hospital directors all use similar terms in conveying that the
Baxstrom patients are no more a problem than anyone else,
that nobody any longer thinks of them in any special way, no
lists are kept and that one never hears any reference to this
group by staff or patients."'
After one year, 147 Baxstrom patients had been discharged to the
community compared with seven patients who were recommitted
to Matteawan as dangerously mentally ill. For each patient retransferred from the civil hospitals, twenty-one were absolutely
discharged.
Three conclusions can be drawn from the success of Operation
Baxstrom. First, the psychiatrists in the Department of Mental
Hygiene apparently lacked the ability to diagnose properly dangerous mental illness and to determine the necessity for maximum
security confinement. Only seven of the 992 patients diagnosed as
dangerously mentally ill by the Department prior to the Supreme
Court decision in Baxstrom were subsequently found to be danmine the site of treatment. This would give the Department greater flexibility
in determining where the patient's treatment needs can best be met.
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH DIVISION OF RESEARCH, PLANNING AND
DEVELOPMENT TASK FORCE ON STATUTES, FINAL REPORT 5 (undated).

While this recommendation is not necessarily assailable when applied to transfers
between' somewhat similar regional mental hospitals (e.g. Northville and Ypsilanti), it is
subject to severe criticism when applied to transfers between a regional mental hospital
and Ionia.
"8Hunt & Wiley, Operation Baxstrom After One Year, 124 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 974
(1968), as found in ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, MENTAL
ILLNESS, DUE PROCESS AND THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT 224 (1968). For a discussion of
data compiled after the first three months and first six months of "Operation Baxstrom,"
see Morris, The Confusion of Confinement Syndrome: An Analysis of the Confinement of
Mentally Ill Criminals and Ex-Criminals by the Department of Correction of the State of
New York, 17 BUFF. L. REV. 651, 672-73 (1968).
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gerous by the courts. Second, before the Supreme Court required

the removal of ex-convict mental patients from maximum security
confinement, the Department of Mental Hygiene was apparently
unwilling to accept and treat in the civil hospitals those mental
patients whose lives had been stained by the label of criminality. 19
Third, the Department of Mental Hygiene did have the capacity -personnel-wise and facility-wise-to treat within the civil
hospitals over 99 percent of the patients whom it considered
dangerously mentally ill. When the Operation Baxstrom patients

were integrated with other civil patients and given treatment indistinguishable from that afforded other civil patients, they re20
sponded readily.
While no court decision has as yet mandated a judicial determination of dangerousness prior to transfer of a patient into a max-

imum security hospital or maximum security ward, the courts
19White, Krumholz, & Fink, The Adjustment of Criminally Insane Patients to a Civil
Mental Hospital, 53 MENTAL HYGIENE 34 (1969). In discussing the transfer of ex-convict
patients to Central Islip State Hospital (a civil hospital), the authors concluded at 38:
Superficially it appears that, somehow, a sum was taken of two negative
labels, "criminal" plus "psychotic," that yielded a supernegative value of
"the psychotic criminal." These two labels derive from two different philosophies of human behavior and are perhaps complementary approaches to the
same phenomenon. In any case, they do not have additive properties.
20 A New York Department of Mental Hygiene report states:
Although all Operation Baxstrom patients were transferred into the civil
hospitals as involuntary patients, 36% of the patients remaining in the civil
hospitals on August 31, 1966 were retained on a voluntary or informal status.
This compares favorably with the 39% of civil patients generally that were
admitted from the community in June 1966 on these noncompulsory statutes.
N.Y. STATE DEPT. OF MENTAL HYGIENE, MONTHLY STATISTICAL REPORT FOR JUNE
1966,3 (1966).
In recommending that responsibility for the care and treatment of all civil mental
patients, including dangerous patients, be vested in the New York Department of Mental
Hygiene, the Bar Association of the City of New York also proposed
that special safeguards be provided to protect against arbitrary admission of
patients who are not so dangerously mentally ill as to require maximum-security custody. The decision to admit a patient to such an institution
should not be left to administrative judgment. Whereas very few such
patients are admitted to Matteawan under [the existing statute which requires
a judicial determination prior to transfer of "dangerous" civil patients], the
mass exodus and negligible returns of former prisoners following the Baxstrom decision appears to indicate that administrative placements occur in
many cases in which the evidence to obtain a judicial order is lacking.
The Baxstrom case does not of itself require that these admissions be
based solely on a judicial determination of dangerous mental illnesses. In our
opinion, however, the importance of so significant an event in the life of an
individual patient is sufficient warrant to recommend that no person be
admitted to a central high-security facility except upon a judicial determination that it is necessary for the protection of others. New York's 35-year old
policy of requiring judicial action should be continued even though such a
new institution would be entirely within the same hospital system.
ASSOCIATION

OF THE

BAR OF THE

CITY OF

NEW

YORK, MENTAL

ILLNESS,

DUE

PROCESS AND THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT 66-67 [hereinafter cited as N.Y. BAR REPORT].
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have recently shown an increased concern over the possible
abuses of administrative placement. The Baxstrom case is but one
example.
In the District of Columbia, there is only one mental hospital,
St. Elizabeth's. In Covington v. Harris,2 1 the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that a civil
patient, confined in the maximum security ward of St. Elizabeth's
as dangerously mentally ill, could properly petition the court by a
writ of habeas corpus to obtain a transfer to a less restrictive ward
within the same hospital. Chief Judge Bazelon, writing the opinion
of the court, noted that although a mere request for a change of
dormitories or for a transfer between substantially similar wards
would not sustain a petition for habeas corpus, facilities for the
criminally insane
have, in the past, notoriously rivalled maximum security prisons in the pervasiveness of their restraint upon liberty and the
totality of their impositions upon dignity.... Thus, there is
reason to believe that confinement in John Howard [the maximum security ward] is not normally contemplated for civilly
committed patients and entails extraordinary deprivations of
liberty and dignity which make it, in effect, more penitentiary
than mental hospital, even if it also provides some treatment .... It makes little sense to guard zealously against the
possibility of unwarranted deprivations [of liberty] prior to
hospitalization, only to abandon the watch once the patient
disappears behind hospital doors. The range of possible dispositions of a mentally ill person within a hospital, from
maximum security to outpatient status, is almost as wide as
that of dispositions without. The commitment statute no more
authorizes unnecessary restrictions within the former range
22
than it does within the latter.
Two United States Supreme Court cases also tend to indicate
that prior to transfer of an allegedly dangerous mental patient to
Ionia, a judicial hearing with appropriate procedural safeguards
may be necessary to satisfy the due process requirements of the
United States Constituiton. In In re Gault,2 3 a fifteen year old
boy was adjudicated a "juvenile delinquent" and committed to a
state reformatory. Although the hearing was statutorily declared
to be a "civil proceeding," the Supreme Court held that the state's

419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
Id. at 622- 24.
- 387 U.S. 1 (1967).

21

22
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failure to provide Gault with notice of charges, right to counsel,
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination had denied him due process. Although these safeguards are traditionally provided only
in criminal proceedings, the Court focused its attention on the
character of the sanctions that could be imposed in a juvenile
delinquency proceeding and was not swayed by the "civilnot-criminal" label attached to the proceedings or by the
"rehabilitation-not-punishment" motive for the confinement. 2 4 In
requiring these procedural safeguards, the Court stated that
"commitment is a deprivation of liberty. It is incarceration against
one's will, whether it is called 'criminal' or 'civil.' "25
Commentators have suggested that the influence of Gault will
extend beyond the juvenile court system to other "civil" commitments for alcoholism, sexual deviation, narcotics addiction,
and mental illness. 2 6 If the procedures for civil commitment of the
mentally ill are open to constitutional doubt for not providing
certain due process safeguards, surely the Michigan statute,
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 330.67 (1967), by authorizing administrative transfer of nonconvict mental patients into Ionia without
any hearing or procedural safeguards, is even more suspect.
In Specht v. Patterson,2 7 the United States Supreme Court held
that a person convicted under Colorado law of a sex crime (maximum sentence ten years) could not be sentenced under the Colorado Sex Offenders Act (sentence of one day to life) without a
full hearing. The Court held that the imposition of the indeterminate sentence required a new finding of fact which was not
an ingredient of the offense charged at trial, i.e., that the defendant
constitutes a threat of bodily harm to members of the public, or is
an habitual offender and mentally ill.
Similarly, the finding in a probate court civil commitment hear2 Id. at 27. The Court states:
It is of no constitutional consequence-and of limited practical meaning-that the institution to which he is committed is called an Industrial
School. The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a
"receiving home" or an "industrial school" for juveniles is an institution of
confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a lesser or greater time.
25 Id. at 50.
2See e.g., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 174-5 (1967);
When analysis thus focuses on the relation of sanctions to conduct, many of
these systems. resemble the arrangements in the juvenile process which the
court refused to tolerate. The court made casual reference to the juvenilemental illness parallel, and its firm refusal to be bound by the civilcriminal dichotomy casts a long shadow over the conceptual device which
has enabled many commitment systems to isolate themselves from procedural review.
27 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
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ing that a mentally ill person meets the criteria necessary for
involuntary commitment in a regional mental hospital does not
include a finding that the person meets the statutory criteria for
transfer into Ionia. For placement in Ionia, a new finding of fact is
required which was not an ingredient of the initial civil commitment, i.e., that the patient has developed unmistakable dangerous or homicidal tendencies rendering his presence at the
regional hospital a source of danger to others.
The Specht case affords convicted criminals a safeguard. A
similar safeguard should not be denied to mental patients who
have not even been accused of a crime.
B. Ionia and the Regional Hospitals Compared
The progress of modern psychiatric therapy, enhanced by the
introduction of tranquilizing and other psychoactive drugs in the
mid-1950's, has signaled the end of the custody-oriented mental
hospital. While the drugs do not, in and of themselves, cure
patients, they make patients more amenable to other forms of
psychiatric treatment by relieving the symptoms of mental illness.
The incidence of restraint or seclusion of patients has diminished
drastically and locked doors on hospital wards have been
opened. 28 Indeed, the "open-door" concept has become such an
integral part of modern psychiatric treatment that the Michigan
Department of Mental Health has stated that "an effective psychiatric treatment program is not compatible with a maximum
29
security environment."
Ionia State Hospital is a maximum security institution and
provides a maximum security environment. The Final Report of
the lonia State Hospital Medical Audit Committee, published on
October 4, 1965, provides an important insight on the character of
life in the institution.
PatientActivities
The members of the Medical Audit Committee were impressed by the fact that even the oldest buildings were as
clean and polished as men could make them. The floors, old
and in a worn condition, shone like polished ivory. On the
other hand, the wards contain nothing which a man could use
28

As stated by the Michigan Department of Mental Health:
Perhaps it is sufficient to say that today's state mental hospital is no longer
oriented toward isolation, custody, and long-term confinement. On the contrary, the mental hospital today is open, permissive in theme, communityoriented, and patient stays are increasingly shorter in duration.

DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH, PRELIMINARY

HOSPITAL AND
PROSPECTUS].
29

Id. at 9.

FORENSIC CENTER

4 (Dec.

PROSPECTUS FOR SPECIAL SECURITY

16, 1968) [hereinafter cited as DMH-
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to occupy his mind, other than to observe television or read
some very ancient periodicals of which there seemed to be
few. The library, which seems to have a very large collection
of books, was locked and empty. One member of the Committee was informed that the library was not available to
patients because it would be impossible to supervise them in
that setting.
The absolutely apathetic, empty existence that these men
lead on the wards and the groping efforts which they follow to
busy themselves with nothing, is terrible to behold. There was
obviously little about which to be hopeful.
The over concern for security is evident everywhere, and
this reflects the poor understanding of the mission of the
hospital, the culture which surrounds the hospital, and the
lack of training for the security attendant staff. As one passes
from building to building, one begins to feel somewhat like a
mole. Obviously, it is not necessary to pass through the miles
of tunnels in order to go from one building to another. It is
impossible to believe that this is the best way to provide
security. The psychological oppressiveness of this system, in
itself, makes it worthy of modification. It seems that a high
wire fence topped by barbed wire around all of the buildings,
would provide the degree of security necessary to enable
groups of men to move back and forth between buildings.
Clothing is limited and non-working patients are showered
only once a week. Working patients shower two times each
week. The bathing is limited because clothing supplies and
linens are limited. Male patients shave two times each week,
and attendants give haircuts as needed. No barber is employed.
Seclusion patients usually wear only a night shirt. Seriously
disturbed patients may be placed in seclusion without clothes
and with nothing but an indestructible blanket. Anyone who
threatens or attempts suicide is immediately placed in seclusion, a type of restraint usually reserved for acutely disturbed
patients. Since the fear of violence is so marked, and the
number of employees is so limited, there is little tolerance of
any untoward behavior. Seclusion is used quite widely but
always with a physician's order. However, since the physicians are over-extended, there are times when the need for
seclusion is determined by the attendant staff. Physicians'
orders are then obtained as soon as possible, but there can
certainly be a lapse of time, since the few physicians are not
readily available to ward staff.
Night time toilet needs are met by the use of metal pots for
each patient. These pots are not covered, although ten to
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twelve men may sleep in one locked dormitory room. Since
ventilation is a problem in some areas, this must be quite an
30
odorous situation by morning.
The impact on a mental patient of his transfer from a regional
hospital to Ionia is indeed significant.
It should be noted that Ionia has undergone changes in structure and operation in the last ten years. For example, the patient
census has been reduced from 1,472 (1961 census) to 701 (1970
census). The oldest buildings have been closed to patient occupancy and overcrowding has been eliminated in the remaining
31
structures.
However, these improvements have solidified Ionia's position
as Michigan's maximum security mental hospital and highlight the
disparity in treatment afforded patients confined therein and those
confined in regional hospitals. Dr. A. A. Birzgalis, the Medical
Superintendent of Ionia, has admitted:
A negative result of the discharge of the enormous number
of recovered or improved patients is the continuing great
concentration of dangerous patients at the Ionia State Hospital.
The issues of patients being a menace to others and the
need for protection of society from them profoundly influence
the whole operation of the Ionia State Hospital, its programs,
length of hospitalization of patients, relationship of patients
with the personnel of the institution, the relationship of this
hospital with the news media and the public image of this
hospital. Dangerous patients pose special security problems
32
and require proper management.

Ionia State Hospital has also had difficulty in recruiting professional staff. According to the June 30, 1969 Hospital Personnel
Table,3 3 Ionia employed only four psychiatrists and nine professional nurses for the 967 patients confined in the institution. 34 By

comparison, Northville State Hospital, a regional mental hospital
with 1,163 resident patients, employed twenty-eight psychiatrists
and fourty-two professional nurses. Ionia employed no occupa30 FINAL REPORT OF THE IONIA STATE HOSPITAL AUDIT COMMITTEE 16- 18 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as MEDICAL AUDIT].
31 Birzgalis, Statement on the Reorganization of the Structure and Operation of the
Ionia State Hospital Since 1961, at 8 (1970).
32 Id. at 8-9.
33 Raw data supplied by Mr. James Foster, Associate Director of Operations Analysis
and Research Division, Michigan Department of Mental Health, April 29, 1970.
34 These statistics on the number of patients at the hospitals is as of February 28, 1970.
Raw data supplied by Mr. James Foster, Associate Director of Operations Analysis and
Research Division, Michigan Department of Mental Health, April 29, 1970.
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tional therapists and four social workers. Northville employed
four occupational therapists and thirty-six social workers.
C. Recommendations
At a minimum, 3 5 several statutory changes should be made.

First, the Michigan Legislature should enact the following proposal:
ADMINISTRATIVE PLACEMENT OF MENTAL
PATIENTS IN IONIA SHALL BE ELIMINATED. PRIOR TO THE TRANSFER OF ANY PATIENT FROM A
REGIONAL HOSPITAL TO IONIA, A JUDICIAL
HEARING SHALL BE REQUIRED AND JUDICIAL
APPROVAL OBTAINED. THE PATIENT SHALL RECEIVE PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS INCLUDING,

BUT NOT NECESSARILY LIMITED TO: NOTICE OF
THE ALLEGATION, RIGHT TO COUNSEL, RIGHT
TO INDEPENDENT PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION
(AT STATE'S EXPENSE IF THE INDIVIDUAL IS INDIGENT), RIGHT TO CONFRONT AND
CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES, AND THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. THE BURDEN OF PROOF THAT THE INDIVIDUAL MEETS
THE STATUTORY CRITERIA FOR TRANSFER
SHALL BE PLACED ON THE STATE. ADDITIONALLY, THE STATE SHALL BEAR THE BURDEN OF
EXPLORING POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO
TRANSFER (THAT IS, THE STATE SHALL BE
FORCED TO PROVE THAT NO LESS DRASTIC AL-

TERNATIVE, SUCH AS AN INCREASED DOSAGE
OF TRANQUILIZERS OR TRANSFER TO A MORE
SECURE WARD WITHIN THE SAME HOSPITAL, IS
36
APPROPRIATE TO THE INDIVIDUAL'S CASE).

Second, the criteria for transfer of a patient to Ionia should be
clarified. The statute 37 now provides for transfer to Ionia of any
patient who "develops unmistakable dangerous or homicidal tendencies, rendering his presence [at the regional hospital] a source
of danger to others." (Emphasis added). Similarly, persons who
have committed acts of homicide before or during hospitalization
35 See Section VIII, The Future oflIonia, infra, for recommendations which are considered even more desirable.
36 See Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966), in which the court, per Judge
Bazelon, held that prior to ordering the involuntary confinement of an individual in a
mental hospital, the court should satisfy itself that no less onerous disposition, such as
outpatient treatment with a guardian appointed, would serve the purpose of the commitment.
37MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.67 (1967).
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and whose presence at the regional hospital is a danger to others,
may be transferred. While the standard seems sufficient on its
face, the word "danger" and its derivatives need further definition. As Judge Bazelon recently stated:
"[D]angerousness" is a many splendored thing. Unless muzzled by discriminating analysis, it is likely to weigh against
nominally competing considerations the way a wolf weighs
against a sheep in the same scales: even if the sheep is
heavier when weighed separately, somehow the wolf always
prevails when the two are weighed together. Keeping dangerousness on a taut leash is especially difficult where there is
danger of murder, since the danger is admittedly grave and
since its improbability which theoretically discounts its gravity, is exceedingly difficult to quantify.
Moreover, once a man has shown himself to be dangerous,
it is all but impossible for him to prove the negative that he is
38
no longer a menace.
Instead of utilizing the vague standard of "develops unmistakable dangerous tendencies," the following terminology should
be substituted:
NO PATIENT SHALL BE TRANSFERRED TO IONIA
UNLESS THE REGIONAL HOSPITAL PROVES BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE
PATIENT, WHILE CONFINED IN THE REGIONAL
HOSPITAL, COMMITTED AN ACT OR ACTS WHICH
HAVE RESULTED IN, OR IF CONTINUED WILL
NECESSARILY RESULT IN, SERIOUS BODILY INJURY OR DEATH TO OTHER PATIENTS OR HOSPITAL PERSONNEL AND THAT THERE WAS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR SUCH BEHAVIOR. FURTHER,
THE HOSPITAL MUST PROVE THAT IT HAS UNDERTAKEN ALL REASONABLE EFFORTS TO PREVENT REOCCURRENCE OF THE CONDUCT AND
THAT SUCH EFFORTS HAVE FAILED TO DETER
THE PATIENT AND THAT THERE IS REASON TO
BELIEVE THAT THE PATIENT'S INJURIOUS CONDUCT WILL CONTINUE AND BE REPEATED IN
THE FUTURE.
PENDING THE COURT HEARING AND DETERMINATION, THE HOSPITAL SHALL BE PERMITTED TO UNDERTAKE REASONABLE PRECAUTIONS, SUCH AS ISOLATING AND RESTRAINING THE PATIENT, TO INSURE THE SAFETY OF
8 Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 627 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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OTHER PATIENTS AND HOSPITAL PERSONNEL.

HOWEVER, THESE PRECAUTIONS SHALL NOT IN39
CLUDE EMERGENCY TRANSFER TO IONIA.
Third, steps should be taken to insure that dangerous patients
transferred to Ionia are transferred back to the regional hospitals
when their conditions sufficiently improve. In discussing the discharge of patients from Ionia, Dr. Birzgalis has stated that the
patients "can be divided into two main groups, namely, 1) patients
who are returned either to the criminal courts or to the correctional institutions and 2) patients who are placed on convalescent
status into the open community."' 40 Dr. Birzgalis' statement seems
to indicate that dangerous patients who have been transferred into
Ionia from the regional hospitals are not transferred back to the
regional hospitals when their condition has improved to the point
that they are no longer dangerous. In essence, the regional hospitals are permitted to "give up" on problem patients and to relieve
themselves of this burden permanently by transferring patients to
Ionia. This may even be a factor that unnecessarily encourages
transfer to Ionia. Considering the detrimental effects of maximum
security confinement on the treatment potential of patients, retransfer to the regional hospitals when the danger abates is highly
desirable.
It is not sufficient merely to provide by statute that the Superintendent of Ionia or the Director of the Department of Mental
Health shall administratively order the retransfer of ex-dangerous
patients from Ionia to the regional hospitals. The New York
experience is illuminating on this point. Prior to 1966, the statute
merely provided that a person transferred into Matteawan as
dangerously mentally ill was to be retained there until he was "no
longer dangerous to safety whereupon he may be ...transferred

to any hospital in the department [of Mental Hygiene] upon the
order of the commissioner [of Mental Hygiene]." 4 1 In response to
criticism of the Department of Mental Hygiene's failure to retransfer to regional hospitals those patients who were no longer
dangerous, the New York legislature amended the statute in 1966
to provide a six month limitation on the original period of detention of any person transferred to Matteawan as dangerously men39The author has considered other possible criteria for transfer to Ionia such as "patient
manifests suicidal tendencies" or "patient poses a high risk of escape." The existing
statute does not permit transfer on these grounds. Considering the differences in treatment
between the regional hospitals and Ionia, an expansion of existing transfer criteria is not
warranted.
40 Birzgalis, supra note 3 1, at 10.
41

Ch. 704, §4, [1963] N.Y. LAWS.
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tally ill.42 Thereafter the director of Matteawan could apply to the
court for a further period of detention if the patient continued to
be dangerous. Of the 210 patients transferred into Matteawan
pursuant to the transfer statute who still remained there in 1966,
the Superintendent of Matteawan chose to request orders of retention for only seventy-four. 43 The other 136 patients were retransferred to the regional hospitals of the Department of Mental
Hygiene. Unless 136 dangerous mental patients were miraculously cured for their dangerousness in a very short time, it may
be assumed that 62 per cent of the patients confined in Matteawan
in 1966 pursuant to the "dangerous patient transfer statute" were
not, in fact, dangerous.
In order to lessen the possibility that a patient transferred to
Ionia as dangerous will be retained indefinitely regardless of improvement in his mental condition, and to prevent claims that the
Ionia hospital staff has not recognized a patient's improvement or
has arbitrarily delayed in acting upon it, the concept of periodic
judicial review should be introduced into Michigan law. A new
statute should provide:
NO PATIENT ADMITTED INTO IONIA STATE
HOSPITAL SHALL BE RETAINED IN IONIA FOR
LONGER THAN SIX MONTHS EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY COURT ORDER GRANTED AT INTERVALS OF SIX MONTHS AFTER NOTICE TO
THE PATIENT AND OPPORTUNITY TO DEMAND A
HEARING AS HEREINAFTER PROVIDED.
IF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF IONIA DETERMINES THAT ANY PATIENT ADMITTED TO IONIA
REQUIRES RETENTION IN IONIA BECAUSE OF
DANGEROUS MENTAL ILLNESS, HE SHALL APPLY WITHIN SIX MONTHS OF THE PATIENT'S ADMISSION FOR AN ORDER AUTHORIZING RETENTION. THE PATIENT SHALL BE NOTIFIED OF THE
APPLICATION AND GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO
DEMAND A HEARING. THE PATIENT SHALL BE
ACCORDED ALL PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS ACCORDED AT THE PREVIOUS HEARING [See first recommendation supra]. THE STANDARD FOR RETENTION SHALL BE THE SAME AS FOR INITIAL ADMISSION TO IONIA [See second recommendation supra].
THE COURT MAY ORDER THE RETENTION OF
42

N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 85 (McKinney 1971).
43Letter from W. C. Johnston, M.D., Superintendent of Matteawan, November 22,
1966; Letter from C. Stamatovich, M.D., Assistant Commissioner, N.Y. Dept. of Mental
Hygiene, January 25, 1967.
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THE PATIENT (WHEN THE STANDARD IS MET)
FOR A PERIOD NOT TO EXCEED SIX MONTHS
FROM THE DATE OF THE ORDER, THE TRANSFER
OF THE PATIENT TO A REGIONAL HOSPITAL, OR
THE RELEASE OF THE PATIENT FROM INVOLUNTARY CONFINEMENT.
FURTHER ORDERS FOR CONTINUED RETENTION MAY BE APPLIED FOR AND ORDERED AS
ABOVE.
IV.

INCOMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL

A. Inadequaciesof the Pre-1967Procedure
In 1966 the Michigan Legislature enacted statutes which substantially changed the procedure used to determine competency to
stand trial. 44 Prior to 1966 the statute mandated confinement of
persons found incompetent to stand trial in Ionia State Hospital.
The 1966 legislation was enacted in response to revelations that
defendants were being found incompetent to stand trial and committed to Ionia- many for the rest of their lives- as an expedient
disposition of the charges against them. 45 In addition, there was
some evidence that the incompetency procedure was abused at
Ionia State Hospital. A Michigan Department of Mental Health
publication stated:
Individuals remained at Ionia for long periods of time in
semi-criminal milieu, without any treatment specifically directed toward readying them for trial.... There was no statutory review procedure which would serve to encourage
frequent reevaluation. The "staff conference" and review by
the Medical Superintendent, accomplished in the normal
course of hospital administration, was the only review. The
clinical notes of many patients reveal that often the treating
physicians were not aware that the individual had not been
convicted of a crime and was in any different status than a
transferee from Jackson Prison. Nor did the clinical notes
reveal that the patient was supposed to be treated in order
that he might return to trial. Records of staff conferences did
not reveal that the staff members conducting the conference
were necessarily aware of what was expected of the defendant upon his return to court and consequently it is obvious

"Nos. 175 & 266 [1966] Mich. Pub. Acts, eff. March 10, 1967.
4 See generally Hess & Thomas, Incompetency to Stand Trial: Procedures, Results,
and Problems, 119 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 713 (1963); and Comment, Criminal Law-Insane
Persons-Competency to Stand Trial, 59 MICH. L. REV. 1078 (1961).
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that the staff would be unable to make an informed judgment.

46

Although the 1966 statutes helped eliminate abuses in incompetency procedures, a careful analysis of the 1966 legislation
and the administrative decisions of the Department of Mental
Health and the Attorney General indicates actual and potential
new abuse that should be eliminated.
B. Confinement in Ionia of Persons Found Incompetent to Stand
Trial
When a court determines that a person who has been accused
of a crime is mentally incompetent to stand trial, the statute
provides that "he shall be committed to the department of mental
health for treatment in a public institution approved for the purpose by the department of mental health." '4 7 While some incompetent defendants have been placed in the regional hospitals
since the 1966 enactments, 101 patients who were adjudicated
incompetent to stand trial after the new laws went into effect
remain confined in Ionia State Hospital. Only fifteen of the 101
were initially admitted to regional hospitals before they were
transferred to Ionia. The remaining eighty-six were admitted
directly to Ionia upon a finding of incompetency to stand trial.
The statute should be changed because it provides for mandatory commitment to a mental hospital upon a determination of
incompetency to stand trial. That determination is based on considerations of whether the accused understands the criminal proceedings against him and whether he is capable of assisting his
attorney in defense of the charge. The test of competency to stand
trial is neither synonymous with the test for involuntary commitment of civil patients to a mental hospital nor determinative of
the accused's need for hospitalization. Thus, automatic commitment to a mental hospital upon a finding of incompetency to
stand trial implicitly violates the principle enunicated by the
United States Supreme Court in Specht v. Patterson that without
a full hearing a defendant cannot be sentenced under a statute
which requires a new finding of fact. Commitment to a mental
hospital requires a "new finding of fact" which is not a part of the
incompetency determination.
A statute should be drafted to provide:

"MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH, PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 10 (1967) [hereinafter cited as DMH-PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION].
47
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §767.27a (5)(1968).
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WHEN A COURT DETERMINES THAT A DEFENDANT IS INCOMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL, IT
MAY ORDER THE ACCUSED TRANSFERRED TO
THE JURISDICTION OF THE PROBATE COURT IN
THE COUNTY OF HIS RESIDENCE FOR AN EXAMINATION AND JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF
WHETHER THE ACCUSED MEETS THE STATUTORY TEST FOR CIVIL COMMITMENT. IF SO, THE
INDIVIDUAL SHALL BE HOSPITALIZED IN A REGIONAL HOSPITAL.

Transfer of the individual from criminal court jurisdiction to
probate court jurisdiction for a determination of civil commitability seems warranted, first, because the accused's mental
condition which rendered him incompetent to stand trial may also
meet the criteria for civil commitment, and, second, because the
state has a legitimate interest in bringing criminal defendants to
justice as quickly as possible. The treatment accorded the patient
in a regional hospital can be expected to improve his mental
condition to the extent that he will become competent to stand
trial sooner than if he received no treatment.
Since the state has this interest in bringing accused criminals to
justice, the state may require the mentally incompetent defendant
to undergo therapy designed to restore his competency; but unless
the defendant's mental condition meets the criteria for civil commitment, involuntary institutionalization for treatment should not
be required. If it can be shown that the mentally incompetent
person can obtain adequate treatment for his mental condition
without the necessity of involuntary confinement, the court should
48
make the less onerous disposition.
The existing statute should also be changed because it provides
for an administrative determination of the proper place for treatment of mentally incompetent defendants-a determination that
may result in placement in Ionia. It is an elementary but fundamental principle of our legal system that a person accused of a
crime is presumed innocent until he is proven guilty. Although he
may be required to post bail and is obligated to appear at his trial,
a defendant in a criminal case does not forfeit his right to vote, to
engage in a profession, etc., because of his status as an accused.
For purposes of mental hospitalization, mentally incompetent defendants are similarly situated with noncriminal mentally ill persons. The legal and social policy arguments which support the
conclusion that admission to Ionia of allegedly "dangerous" civil
48

See discussion of Lake v. Cameron, supra note 36.
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patients should not be left to administrative judgment also apply
to the admission of persons accused of crimes. 49 The recommendations made previously should be extended to mentally incompetent defendants:
PRIOR TO THE ADMISSION TO IONIA OF A
MENTALLY INCOMPETENT DEFENDANT, A JUDICIAL HEARING SHALL BE REQUIRED AND JUDICIAL APPROVAL SHALL BE OBTAINED. PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS SHALL BE ACCORDED THE
PATIENT. THE STANDARD FOR PLACEMENT IN
IONIA SHALL BE PHRASED IN TERMS OF REQUIRING PROOF THAT THE DEFENDANT ENGAGED
IN CONDUCT WHILE A PATIENT IN A REGIONAL
HOSPITAL THAT HAS RESULTED IN, OR IF CONTINUED WILL NECESSARILY RESULT IN,
SERIOUS BODILY INJURY OR DEATH TO OTHERS.
PERIODIC JUDICIAL REVIEW OF COMMITMENTS
50
TO IONIA SHALL BE REQUIRED.
49 See Subsection I II.A., Administrative Placement of Dangerous Patients, supra.
50

1f further proof of the dangers of a policy of mandatory commitment and administrative placement of mentally incompetent defendants is needed, New York's experience
with incompetents is illustrative. Prior to 1965, New York required mandatory commitment of mentally incompetent defendants at Matteawan. In 1965, the applicable statute
was amended to allow the place of hospitalization to be determined by the individual's
medical needs, not by a conclusive presumption of dangerousness from the mere fact of
indictment for any crime. The decision of where to send the mentally incompetent defendant was taken out of the court's hands and entrusted to the New York Department of
Mental Hygiene. Presumably fewer defendants would be sent to Matteawan under the new
procedure. However, the Bar Association of the City of New York reported that in the
first seven months of operation under the new law, there were eighty-five patients in one
incompetent subcategory assigned to Matteawan by the Department of Mental Hygiene
compared with only forty-seven patients so assigned by the courts during the entire prior
fiscal year. N.Y. BAR REPORT, supra note 20, at 99. The Bar Association concluded:
We agree with the basic but unarticulated premise of the new procedures-that a defendant who is to be hospitalized should be cared for in an
ordinary civil state hospital unless the nature of his illness requires care and
custody under high-security conditions. We also believe, however ... , that so
long as a central high-security facility is used for these patients, the decision
as to the need for such custody should be made by a court.... The available
statistics appear to indicate that when the decision is left to clinical judgment,
placement at Matteawan occurs in a far greater number of cases than when a
court decides, and that very few defendants sent by courts to civil hospitals
under the former procedures had to be transferred to Matteawan at a later
date.
In our view the state should not continue to view the mere pendency of a
criminal charge or indictment as a rational basis for denying these patients
the same protection against unnecessary confinement in a central maximum-security correctional institution which is given to every other patient
not actually serving a penal sentence-a judicial determination of dangerous
mental illness.
N.Y. BAR REPORT, supra note 20, at 100- 101. See generally, Morris, The Confusion of
Confinement Syndrome Extended: The Treatment of Mentally III Non-Criminals in New
York, 18 BUFF. L. REV. 393 412-22 (1969).
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C. "Old-Law" Patients
Instead of protecting mentally incompetent defendants until
they were ready for trial, incompetency adjudications prior to
1967 were used as an alternative to the regular penal system
without the formalities of trial and conviction. 51 As a result of this
abuse, 588 mentally incompetent patients were confined in Ionia
when the new legislation became effective on March 10, 1967.52
The act specifically provided that persons presently confined in
Ionia as incompetent to stand trial under the old law "shall be
subject to the provisions of this 1966 amendatory act. . . -53 In
order to accelerate the processing of "old-law" incompetent defendants, the Legislature enacted a special section 5 4 in 1967
which certified incompetent defendants to the Probate Court of
Ionia County. Nevertheless, 173 "old-law" incompetents remain
confined in Ionia.
There are several complicated constitutional issues involved in
the continued confinement of these "old-law" incompetents in
Ionia. First, it is arguable that those unconvicted defendants who
have been confined in Ionia for periods exceeding the maximum
sentences to which they could be subjected after trial and conviction are similarly situated with mentally ill ex-convicts. Following the rationale of Baxstrom v. Herold, if a person convicted of a
crime cannot be detained in Ionia by the administrative decision
of the Director of Mental Health after his sentence has expired,
surely an unconvicted defendant cannot be detained by the Director beyond the maximum possible sentence that could be imposed
against him if he had been convicted. Further, the Court in Baxstrom held that ex-convicts whose sentences have expired cannot
be administratively classified as dangerously mentally ill in spite
of their proven past criminal activity; a fortiori this holding applies
to "sentence-expired" accused defendants whose past criminal
activity is only alleged.5 5
The second issue concerns the fact that the statute 56 authorizes
51 During the period July 1954 to December 1960 a total of 470 defendants were
committed to Ionia as incompetent to stand trial, a rate of about 84 admissions per year.
During this same period approximately 105 were discharged back to the committing court,
a rate of little more than 16 per year. Comment. Criminal Law-Insane PersonsCompetency to Stand Trial, 59 MICH. L. REV. 1078, 1088 (196 1).
52 Birzgalis, supra note 3 1, at 5.
53 No. 266, § 3,[1966] Mich. Pub. Acts.
54 MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.27c (1968).
55 On the other hand, it can be argued that until Act 266 became effective, time spent by
defendants incompetent to stand trial in Ionia was not credited against any sentence
subsequently imposed at trial. However, at least since March 10, 1967, the effective date
of Act 266, "old-law" patients should be entitled to this credit.
56 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.27(c) (1968).
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civil commitment of these "old-law" patients by the Probate
Court of Ionia County. In fact, the statute also authorized the
assignment of "a visiting or retired judge to the Ionia county
probate court for a period not to extend beyond June 30, 1969, for
the exclusive purpose of hearing cases under this section which
judge is authorized to hold court within the Ionia State Hospital."
For involuntary civil commitment of any other mentally ill person,
the statutes require a petition and hearing before the probate court
of the county in which the mentally ill person resides. 5 7 A court
might hold that the Michigan statute denied equal protection of
the laws by authorizing civil commitment of incompetent defendants through a specially convened Ionia County Probate Court
whose exclusive purpose was to hear these cases and which might
have been less sympathetic to the patient's position than the court
in the patient's home county. It would be difficult for the State to
contend that involuntary commitment of an individual at Ionia as
incompetent to stand trial changes his county of residence to
58
Ionia County.
Finally, those "old-law" incompetents who were retained as
civil patients in Ionia might have been denied equal protection of
the laws for yet another reason. The law currently authorizes
transfer into Ionia of patients in the regional hospitals who develop unmistakable dangerous or homicidal tendencies and whose
presence there is a source of danger to others. 59 Civil patients
other than "old-law" incompetents are admitted directly to regional hospitals, not Ionia. However, the statute dealing with incompetents, 60 as it was administered, was utilized as an Ionia
admissions statute for "old-law" incompetents. Admission to
Ionia was authorized for this class of civil patients even though
they exhibited no dangerous or homicidal tendencies in a regional
hospital.
To do justice to these "old-law" incompetents who have been
denied justice for so long, this writer recommends that a statute
be enacted to provide:
ALL CIVILLY COMMITTED "OLD-LAW" INCOMPETENTS SHALL BE CERTIFIED TO THE PROBATE COURT OF THE COUNTY OF THEIR RESI57 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.21 (1967).

58 See [1945-46] MICH. ATT'y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 66 where the Attorney General
stated that imprisonment does not alter a person's county of residence.
See also Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, IlI (1966): "Equal protection does not
require that all persons be dealt with identically but it does require that a distinction made

have some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made."
'9 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.67 (1967).
0
" MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 767.27c (1968).
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DENCE. THE PROBATE COURT SHALL DETERMINE THE ISSUE OF CIVIL COMMITTABILITY AS
IT DOES FOR ALL OTHER ALLEGEDLY MENTALLY ILL PERSONS. IF COMMITMENT IS ORDERED, THE PATIENT SHALL BE CONFINED IN
THE REGIONAL HOSPITAL THAT SERVICES HIS
PLACE OF RESIDENCE. ONLY IF THE PATIENT
DEVELOPS DANGEROUS TENDENCIES AT THAT
HOSPITAL SHALL HE BE TRANSFERRED INTO
IONIA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS
OF MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.67 (1967)61
D.

Treatment of Incompetent Defendants in the
Regional Hospitals
In the ten year period from July 1, 1956, to June 30, 1966,

approximately eighty persons per year were adjudicated incompetent to stand trial in Michigan. 62 As mentioned previously,
prior to the 1966 amendatory legislation, all such adjudications
resulted in commitment to Ionia. One of the most significant
changes made in 1966 was the enactment of a section which
provides that once a person has been adjudicated as incompetent
to stand trial "he shall be committed to the department of mental

health for treatment in a public institution."-63 While commitment
is still mandatory under the new legislation, confinement in Ionia
is not.

64

The quality of treatment accorded persons found incompetent
to stand trial who are confined within the regional hospitals requires close examination. There is no doubt as to the right to

treatment of persons confined as incompetent to stand trial. First,
the statute specifically mandates treatment for these patients. 65 As
Professor B. J. George, Jr. has stated:
In the past the Department sometimes felt that it had to
hold persons committed as incompetent to stand trial in a
purely custodial, non-treatment status, a result that com61 Obviously, if the recommendations made previously for changes in MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN, § 330.67 (1967) are adopted, they should apply to these "old-law" incompetents also.
62 DMH-PsYCHIATRiC EVALUATION, supra note 46, at 16.
63 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.27a (5)(1968).
64 Part B of this section recommends the elimination of both mandatory commitment
and administrative placement upon an adjudication of incompetency. The recommendation, if accepted, should result in an even greater reduction in the number of commitments
to Ionia and a significant increase in the number of incompetents confined in the various
regional hospitals. This does not mean that there will be an increase in the total number of
incompetency adjudications. They can be expected to continue at approximately 80 per
year.
65 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.27a (5)(1968).
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pounded the original injustice in committing the man in the
first place without adequate trial of the issue ,of incompetence.
By authorizing treatment, the legislation avoids any suggestion in future litigation that detention without therapy con66
stitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

Professor George's statement that litigation will be avoided is
only correct if therapy is in fact given these patients in the
regional hospitals. The statutory requirement of treatment could
well result in patients who have been inadequately treated obtain67
ing release on writs of habeas corpus.
This is not to suggest that if the statutory requirement of
treatment were eliminated, the state could confine persons adjudicated as incompetent without according them adequate treatment.
As Professor George indicated above, such confinement might
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Furthermore, confinement without adequate treatment to improve his mental condition might arguably violate the accused's constitutional guarantee
68
of a speedy trial.
It appears, however, that the Department of Mental Health
does not consider treatment of incompetent defendants to be its
paramount function. In a memorandum dated September 26,
1968, and addressed to the Superintendents of the regional mental
hospitals, William H. Anderson, M.D., the Department's director,
stated:
When patients in this legal category [incompetent to stand
trial] are hospitalized at the regional hospital, it must be
remembered that these patients do represent a special group
66

George, Michigan's New Mental Health Legislation for Criminal Cases, 46 MICH.

STATE B. J. 13, 19 (Feb. 1967).
67 Habeas corpus can be used

to determine whether a patient's commitment to an
institution conforms to the statutory requirements. Ex parte Brooks, 331 Mich. 631, 50
N.W.2d 306 (1951), Ex parte Fidrych, 331 Mich. 485, 50 N.W.2d 303 (1951); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.4322 (eff. Jan I, 1963). The recent case of Bilingsley v. Birzgalis, 20 Mich. App. 279, 174 N.W.2d 17 (1969), held that that statute, providing the
incompetent defendants confined in an institution cannot be released without the approval
of the Center for Forensic Psychiatry, does not preclude resort by the incompetent to the
remedy of habeas corpus.
Mention should also be made of a case recently decided by the New York Court of
Claims. The court awarded the claimant, a person found incompetent to stand trial, a
$300,000 judgment against the State as compensation for moral and mental degradation,
physical injuries, pain and suffering, and loss of earnings caused by a twelve year denial of
the right to treatment. Whitree v. State, 56 Misc. 2d 693, 290 N.Y.S. 2d 486 (Ct. Cl.
1968).
68 While no court has held that the state has a duty to improve the mental condition of
an incompetent defendant, that conclusion might be reached by a court considering the
four factors of length of delay, cause or motivation of the delay, prejudicial results, and
waiver. The general rule is that these factors must be weighed in determining whether
there has been a denial of the right to a speedy trial. Needel v. Scafati, 412 F.2d 761 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 861 (1969).
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in a legal sense and the Department of Mental Health is
charged with their custody and confinement in addition to
their hospital treatment.
Clarification is being sought from the Attorney General as
to the degree of security required [in the regional hospitals].
As an interim measure, you are requested to treat these
patients on locked wards or their equivalent, until they are
either returned to court as competent to stand trial or certified
to the probate court for civil commitment as required by
statute. Although this may constrain, to some degree, therapeutic programming for these individuals, our legal responsibilities for confinement and custody must take precedence.
Although the directive "to treat these patients only on locked
wards or their equivalent" was ostensibly rescinded by a memorandum dated March 19, 1969, this latter memorandum stated
that "the avoidance of an unauthorized absence or escape is to be
given priority consideration."
These memoranda indicate that the Department of Mental
Health is employing a highly questionable policy regarding
patients who are incompetent to stand trial. Although all incompetents evaluated as dangerous or escape risks are supposedly sent directly to Ionia, the Department's policy seems to
be that those incompetents sent to regional hospitals still present a
special security problem, and that treatment of incompetents at
the regional hospitals should be sacrificed to security.
This Department policy has resulted in the decision by some
Medical Superintendents to concentrate all criminal order patients
received by the hospital into a special high security ward without
regard to the level of security required in the individual case.
Thus, there is no assurance that incompetents placed in regional
hospitals instead of Ionia will receive treatment commensurate
69
with their mental conditions as contemplated by the legislation.
Therefore, a new set of principles should be enunciated to
guide the regional hospitals in providing adequate treatment to
mentally incompetent defendants. This writer suggests the following:
69 Even Dr. Anderson has recognized the injustice inherent in this practice. In a
memorandum dated March 5, 1970, to the Superintendents of the regional hospitals, Dr.
Anderson wrote:
My own opinion is that where we are operating separate nursing units for
mentally ill offenders we may well find ourselves duplicating the problems
that originally led to dissatisfaction with the treatment programs at Ionia.
There is also the possibility that separate units may be looked upon by courts
as not having the same level of access to therapeutic resources as mixed
nursing units.
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1. The Department of Mental Health is not a jailor and
should neither be expected nor required to treat any patient in its
custody as a prisoner. The Department of Mental Health has
"custody" of civil mental patients committed through the probate
courts. The same treatment given to the civil mental patients
should be afforded those patients who are adjudged incompetent
to stand trial and committed to the Department by the criminal
courts. These patients should no longer be treated as criminals
and confined in high security or locked wards; security should
only be maintained when a patient's mental condition warrants it.
Patients within the Department's custody should be released on
home visits, granted leaves of absence, and placed on convalescent status when their mental conditions have improved
sufficiently.
2. Any person adjudicated as incompetent to stand trial is not
a criminal. Indeed, if he were not mentally ill, an accused would,
in most cases, be entitled to his freedom (on bail) pending his trial.
3. In any case where a person adjudicated as incompetent to
stand trial is not receiving treatment in accordance with the needs
of his particularcondition, the patient, the Department of Mental
Health, and the very purpose of the incompetency commitment,
are being abused. Incompetency commitments should no longer
be used as a means to dispose of difficult cases or as a device for
preventive detention.
In part B of this section, it was suggested that for purposes of
commitment to regional hospitals or commitment to Ionia, mentally incompetent defendants should be similarly situated with
noncriminal mentally ill persons. Similarly, for purposes of treatment within the regional hospitals, mentally incompetent defendants who have been committed to the regional hospitals should be
similarly situated with noncriminal mental patients in the regional
hospitals. Because of the importance of this point, a statute should
be drafted to the effect that:
ANY PERSON WHO HAS BEEN ADJUDICATED INCOMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL AND COMMITTED
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH
SHALL BE TREATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
NEEDS OF HIS MENTAL CONDITION, IRRESPECTIVE OF HIS LEGAL STATUS.
E. The Goals of Treatment and PeriodicJudicialReview
The above recommendation is designed to ensure that mental
hospital personnel dealing with incompetent defendants view their
function as non-judgmental therapists treating mentally ill human
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beings. While mentally ill incompetent defendants should be
treated like all other mental patients, should the goal of treatment
be the same? Should the goal be to restore the mentally incompetent patient's mental health and social competency, or
should the goal be to provide the necessary treatment which will
allow the patient to achieve legal competency? These questions
are very significant because the choice of goal may affect the
therapy given the patient. For example, if the goal is speedy
restoration of legal competency, extensive shock or drug therapy
might be utilized to render the defendant legally competent at the
expense of his ultimate recovery to full mental health. This result
70
should be avoided.
Drs. Hess and Thomas, in examining incompetency commitments to Ionia prior to the 1966 legislative amendments, made
two relevant observations:
Considering the meaning and purpose of incompetency
concepts, it would seem that if the court has any interest, it
should be to ensure that the competent individual be tried as
soon as he can be considered competent. With this in mind,
we were amazed to learn of the almost total lack of interest
the court took in the defendant after his commitment.
The confusion existing at the time of the incompetency
hearing follows the defendant to the hospital. Cases were
frequent in which the hospital staff disagreed with the diagnosis made by the examining psychiatrist at the time of the
hearing. It was also not uncommon that the hospital staff, in
view of the patient's mental status, could not understand why
the patient had been committed. The label "incompetent"
was a familiar one to hospital personnel, but the meaning and
implications of this label were not clear. This being the case,
it was not-surprising that the goals of treatment were vague
71
and inconsistent.
At the time of these comments, at least half the patients in Ionia
were in the incompetent to stand trial category. If the Ionia
personnel were confused as to the goal of treatment, the personnel
at the regional hospitals, where only a very small percentage of
the patients are in this category, are even more likely to be
confused today.
These problems could be remedied by the adoption of the
70

Comment, Criminal Law-Insane Persons-Competency to Stand Trial, 59 MICH. L.

REV. 1078, 1098-99 (1961).
71

Hess & Thomas, Incompetency to Stand Trial: Procedures, Results, and Problems,

119 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 713, 716- 17 (1963).
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following suggestions. First, the regional hospital personnel
should be advised that, as specified by the proposed statute, they
are to treat incompetent defendant patients exactly as they treat
all other patients. The goal of treatment- restoration to mental
health and social competency- should be the same for all
patients. While treatment methods and goals should not differ, the
personnel should be advised that whenever in the course of treatment they are of the opinion that a patient has regained legal
competence, the appropriate court should be immediately informed of this fact and the patient returned to court. The Department of Mental Health should instruct its personnel about the test
of competency and the fact that in many cases a person may be
legally competent to stand trial before he is ready for release into

society.
Second, a statute should be drafted to provide:
NO PERSON ADJUDICATED INCOMPETENT TO
STAND TRIAL AND ADMITTED TO A DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH HOSPITAL SHALL BE
RETAINED IN THE CUSTODY OF THE DEPARTMENT FOR LONGER THAN SIX MONTHS EXCEPT
AS AUTHORIZED BY COURT ORDER AT INTERVALS OF SIX MONTHS GRANTED AFTER NOTICE TO THE PATIENT AND AN OPPORTUNITY
TO DEMAND A HEARING AS HEREINAFTER PROVIDED.
IF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE HOSPITAL
IN WHICH AN INCOMPETENT DEFENDANT IS
CONFINED DETERMINES THAT THE PATIENT IS
NOT YET COMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL AND REQUIRES RETENTION IN THE HOSPITAL FOR FURTHER TREATMENT OF HIS- MENTAL CONDITION,
HE SHALL APPLY WITHIN SIX MONTHS OF THE
72
PATIENT'S ADMISSION TO THE CRIMINAL
COURT FOR AN ORDER AUTHORIZING RETENTION. THE PATIENT AND HIS ATTORNEY SHALL
BE NOTIFIED OF THE APPLICATION AND GIVEN
AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEMAND A HEARING. IF
THE COURT DETERMINES THAT THE DEFENDANT IS STILL INCOMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL,
IT MAY ORDER HIM RETAINED FOR A PERIOD
72 Under this writer's proposals, the probate court orders initial commitment of the
incompetent defendant when he meets the criteria for civil commitability. However, since
the defendant, when competent, is returned to the criminal court for trial, that court, which
initially adjudicated him incompetent, should determine whether he has been restored to
competency.
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NOT TO EXCEED SIX MONTHS FROM THE DATE
OF THE ORDER.
FURTHER ORDERS FOR CONTINUED RETENTION MAY BE APPLIED FOR AND ORDERED AS
ABOVE.
AT ANY TIME WITHIN ANY SIX MONTH PERIOD, THE SUPERINTENDENT OR THE DEFENSE
ATTORNEY MAY NOTIFY THE COURT THAT IN
HIS OPINION THE ACCUSED HAS BEEN RESTORED TO COMPETENCY. UPON SUCH NOTIFICATION THE COURT SHALL IMMEDIATELY HEAR
AND DETERMINE THE ISSUE OF COMPETENCY.
IF THE COURT DETERMINES THAT THE DEFENDANT IS STILL INCOMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL,
IT MAY ORDER HIM RETAINED FOR A PERIOD
NOT TO EXCEED SIX MONTHS FROM THE DATE
OF THE ORDER.
The principle of periodic judicial review, which was previously
recommended for dangerously mentally ill patients transferred
into Ionia, seems equally applicable where the issue is whether a
defendant adjudicated as incompetent to stand trial by one court,
and adjudicated civilly commitable by another court, is now competent to stand trial. Society cannot and should not expect physicians to play the role of judges and determine in every case when
the defendant is competent to stand trial. The responsibility for
application of this legal standard should rest with the courts.
The recommendation also takes into consideration the importance of defense counsel in the determination of competency to
stand trial. Since a major portion of the test of competency concerns the accused's ability to assist his attorney in defending the
criminal charge, defense counsel should be permitted to request a
hearing on the issue when he is of the opinion that the accused
has been restored to competency.
As a final safeguard, a statute should be enacted to provide:
THE CRIMINAL COURT IS AUTHORIZED TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE A COURSE OF TREATMENT SELECTED FOR A NONCIVILLY COMMITTABLE INCOMPETENT DEFENDANT. THE
TREATING PHYSICIAN OR THERAPIST SHALL BE
PERMITTED TO INFORM THE COURT WHEN THE
DEFENDANT HAS REGAINED LEGAL COMPETENCE. PERIODIC JUDICIAL REVIEW (AS OUTLINED ABOVE) SHOULD ALSO APPLY TO THIS
SITUATION.
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F. Incompetent Defendants as Voluntary Patients and Release
of Incompetent Defendants on Convalescent Status
It was recommended in part B of this section that persons
adjudicated incompetent to stand trial should not be automatically
confined as involuntary patients in a mental hospital. Such confinement is not warranted where the individual's mental condition
does not meet the standard for involuntary civil commitment. If
this recommendation is accepted, and if the recommendation that
the goal of confinement be the treatment of the patient's mental
illness is also accepted, then the modern psychiatric approach of
admission of patients to mental hospitals on a voluntary basis
should logically apply to incompetent defendants. Nevertheless,
regarding the release of incompetent defendant patients from the
regional hospitals, the memorandum of September 26, 1968, from
Dr. Anderson to the hospital Superintendents stated:
Thus it is clear that such patients, as has been previously
stated, shall not be released on convalescent care or visit, and
all indicated reasonable precautions shall be taken to prevent
such patients from leaving the hospital without authoriza73
tion.
There is a legitimate question as to whether an individual who
is well enough to be considered for release on convalescent care,
that is, well enough to maintain himself away from the hospital,
can still be considered incompetent to stand trial. However, in an
unusual situation, for example, where the individual has access to
private therapeutic help and has a family to watch after him, a
patient might be both capable of release on convalescent care and
incompetent to stand trial. Such a person should not be denied
release, and, if necessary, a statute should be drafted to so pro74
vide.
G. The Eighteen Month Commitment and Removal
from "Accused" Status
Certain statutory provisions were designed to limit to eighteen
months the treatment of an incompetent accused in a Department
of Mental Health hospital. 75 If a defendant becomes competent to
73

This directive was reiterated in a March 14, 1969, memorandum.
74 It should be noted that the concept of convalescent leave was severely abused under

the pre-1966 legislation. "During the period July 1, 1965, to June 30, 1966, 275 paroles
were granted for convalescence ... while 452 persons were returned to court as competent
to stand trial."

DMH-PSYCHIATRiC

EVALUATION, supru note 46, at

11. Release on

convalescent status instead of return to trial as a competent should rarely be necessary.
75 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.27a(6)-(8) (1968).
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stand trial prior to or at the end of eighteen months, the statutes
provide for his return to court for trial. However, if the Department of Mental Health determines that the defendant is still
incompetent to stand trial at the end of eighteen months, a section
provides that the Department shall certify its opinion to the probate court in the county from which the defendant was originally
committed. 76 That court is required to treat the certification as a
petition for involuntary civil commitment. The probate court may
make only one of two dispositions: 77 it may order defendant
civilly committed if he is civilly committable; or, if he is not civilly
committable, it must return the defendant to the criminal court
which initially ordered him committed as incompetent to stand
trial. If the second alternative is followed, the criminal court, after
holding a hearing, may make one of two dispositions: it may
determine that defendant is now competent to stand trial and
proceed to trial; or, reversing the probate court decision, it may
order the defendant civilly committed. Time spent in Department
of Mental Health custody, whether before or after the eighteen
month period, is credited against any sentence imposed on the
defendant in the pending criminal case, and the statute of limitations on the criminal charge begins to run upon entry of the order
of commitment 8
These statutes, taken together, attempt to eliminate a major
abuse of pre-1966 legislation. No longer are defendants confined
in a mental hospital for years or a lifetime in the status of incompetent defendant. However, this legislation, while progressive
in purpose, suffers from a logical inconsistency, for it erroneously
presumes that any person who is incompetent to stand trial is
necessarily civilly committable. As mentioned above, the tests are
not synonymous, and the statute is silent on the proper disposition
of a patient who, after eighteen months, is incompetent to stand
79
trial, but not civilly committable.
The 1966 amendatory statutes have also been subjected to a
rather conservative construction by the Attorney General. Prior
to 1966, if Ionia returned a patient to court as competent to stand
76 Id. § 767.27a(7).

7Id. § 767.29(a)(8).

7

Thus, if a defendant is charged with a crime that carries a maximum sentence of two
years, he will not be tried for that crime after he has spent two years in Department of
Mental Health custody.
79 It should be noted that these statutes may also violate the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment, for MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.27a(7) (1968) provides for
civil commitment by the probate court in the county where the patient was initially
committed and not the county of his residence. See the discussion of a similar problem in
text accompanying notes 56-58 supra.
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trial and the court held that the defendant was still incompetent, it
could order a new commitment to Ionia. According to Professor
George, "[t]he hospital in turn might return the man immediately,
and the badminton game continue indefinitely with the defendant
as shuttlecock."-80 The eighteen month maximum "time limit" on
the incompetency commitment was designed to end this perverted
game. However, on August 15, 1969, the Attorney General sent a
letter to Dr. Anderson containing the following statement of the
problem and the Attorney General's opinion:
The department [of Mental Health] arrives at an opinion
during-the 18-month commitment period that the defendant is
competent and so certifies the case to the original committing
court. The court, as provided by statute, proceeds to determine the question of competence and in some instances
makes a finding that the defendant is still incompetent to
stand trial and returns the person to our jurisdiction by the
issuance of a new order which usually by its terms again
commits the patient for a period not to exceed 18 months.
Your question is whether the 18-month period as prescribed in the statute should run at the time the patient was
originally committed or whether a new 18-month period begins at the time of the second commitment.
I advise you that the 18-month period cannot run as of the
time that the patient was originally committed since the original commitment has been discharged by the act of the Department of Mental Health in certifying the patient back to
the original committing court for the court's present disposition. It follows that the order under the authority of
which the Department of Mental Health now receives the
patient is the order constituting the second commitment. The
18-month period provided by the statute therefore applies
from and after the second order of commitment.
Thus, the badminton game, with the possibility of indeterminate - even lifetime - commitment, continues unabated.

The recommendations calling for periodic judicial review of the
commitment of persons hospitalized after an adjudication of incompetency to stand trial 8 ' eliminate the need for the eighteen
month commitment provisions of the Michigan statute.8 2 The
proposed changes properly recognize that civil commitment
should not be automatic upon adjudication of incompetency to
stand trial, and they recognize the court's continuing respon80 George, supra note 66, at 19.
81 See text accompanying note 72 supra.
82 MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.27a(6)-(8) (1968).

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 5 :1

sibility for incompetent patients. If these recommendations are
accepted, certain sections8 3 should be repealed. However, the
section which provides for the crediting of time spent in a Department of Mental Health institution against any criminal sentence
subsequently imposed, 4 should be retained. The statute of limitations on the pending criminal charge should start to run upon the
adjudication of incompetency to stand trial, not upon the entry of
an order of commitment, as the statute presently provides. In
accord with a Bar Association of the City of New York recommendation on the subject, 5 the following addition to the Michigan
statutes is proposed:
THE CRIMINAL COURT SHALL DISMISS THE
PROSECUTION AGAINST ANY DEFENDANT ADJUDICATED INCOMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL
WHENEVER:
(1) THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN HOSPITALIZED, VOLUNTARILY OR INVOLUNTARILY,
FOR A PERIOD LONGER THAN THE MAXIMUM OR
PROBABLE SENTENCE THAT SHOULD BE IMPOSED AGAINST HIM IF HE WERE CONVICTED
OF THE CHARGE AGAINST HIM; OR
(2) THE PROSECUTOR NOTIFIES THE COURT OF
HIS INTENTION NOT TO PROSECUTE THE CASE;
OR
(3) THE COURT DETERMINES THAT IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, THE ACTUAL OR PROSPECTIVE DELAY UNTIL TRIAL MAKES IT UNFAIR TO
FURTHER POSTPONE THE CASE.
IF THE DEFENDANT IS HOSPITALIZED, THE
COURT SHALL NOTIFY THE HOSPITAL OF THE
DISMISSAL OF PROSECUTION. THEREAFTER, THE
PATIENT SHALL BE RELEASED FROM THE HOSPITAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED FOR OTHER CIVIL PATIENTS.
V.

CRIMINAL IRRESPONSIBILITY

Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 767.27b (1968) provides:
Any person, who is tried for a crime and is acquitted by the
court or jury by reason of insanity, shall be committed immediately by order of the court to the department of mental
health for treatment in an appropriate state hospital.
83id.
84 Id. § 767.27a(9).
85N.Y. BAR REPORT, supra note 20, at 120-21.
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The insanity defense is raised in only about one-tenth of 1 percent
of the criminal cases each year, and acquittals on that
basis are a significantly rarer occurrence. 86 The infrequent use of
this defense may be explained by the existence of the mandatory
commitment statute. A defendant charged with a minor offense is
generally loathe to utilize the defense of insanity, because if his
defense is successful, he can be confined indefinitely in Ionia. A
short prison sentence is usually considered a preferable alternative, even though the defendant may have been criminally irresponsible at the time of the criminal act.
The statute quoted above may be constitutionally objectionable
because it provides for mandatory commitment upon an insanity
acquittal and permits the Department of Mental Health to administratively determine the place of confinement.8 7 Although it can
be argued that mandatory commitment following acquittal by reason of insanity is justified by a "presumption" that insantiy existing at the time of the crime continues through the verdict and
supports an order of hospitalization, and that a defendant who is
successful in establishing insanity as a defense cannot object to
the "presumption" of continuing insanity, such a "presumption"
cannot be supported on either theoretical or practical grounds.
In Michigan, once a defendant introduces sufficient evidence of
mental irresponsibililty to create a jury question on the issue, the
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not insane. 8 Thus, a verdict of not guilty by reason
of insanity does not mean that the jury found the defendant to
have been insane, but only that the state did not satisfy its burden
of proving that the defendant was sane. The attempted use of a
"presumption" of continuing insanity arising from a verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity is not justified where there has never
been a finding of insanity. At most, an acquittal by reason of
86 There are now nineteen patients in this category confined in the Ionia State Hospital.
Prior to the enactment of Act 266, all persons acquitted by reason of insanity were
required, by statute, to be confined in Ionia. In the twenty-five year period of 1949 to
1966, only nineteen persons were committed to Ionia following acquittal of murder, and
the hospital averaged about two to three insanity acquittal commitments yearly for crimes
less than murder. DMH-PsYCHIATRIC EVALUATION, supra note 46, at 33.

A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is a prerequisite to commitment for
treatment to the Department of Mental Health of a person acquitted of a crime by reason
of insanity, and the statute cannot be applied where the jury merely returns a verdict of
"not guilty," notwithstanding proper imposition of the insanity defense. People v. Way, 22
Mich.
87 App. 473, 177 N.W.2d 729 (1970).

MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 767.27b (1968).

88 People v. Muste, 137 Mich 216, 100 N.W. 455 (1904). The Michigan Bar Association

in the final draft of the proposed Revised Criminal Code recommended statutory adoption
of this rule regarding allocation of the burden of proof. SPECIAL COMM. OF THE MICHIGAN STATE BAR FOR REVISION OF THE CRIMINAL CODE, MICHIGAN REVISED CRIMINAL
CODE § 720 (1967).
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insanity reflects only a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
sane at the time of the offense.
8 9 the Court of Appeals for the District of
In Bolton v. Harris,
Columbia, construing the District's mandatory commitment statute, recognized the limitations of a verdict of not guilty by reason
of insanity. The court, per Chief Judge Bazelon, relied on Baxstrom v. Herold for the principle that "[t]he commission of criminal acts does not give rise to a presumption of dangerousness
which, standing alone, justifies substantial difference in commitment procedures and confinement conditions for the mentally
ill."9o Thus, committing a person found not guilty by reason of
insanity without affording him the procedural safeguards established under the civil commitment scheme constituted a denial of
equal protection of the laws. The court rejected the argument,
previously rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Baxstrom, that expeditious commitment of various categories of
non-convict mentally ill persons is somehow justified because of
the dangerous or criminal propensities of the individuals involved.
It must be shown in a civil commitment hearing that the defendant's mental condition meets the criteria for involuntary civil
commitment.
Judge Bazelon also relied on the Supreme Court decision in
Specht v. Pattersonto rule that the mandatory commitment statute was constitutionally suspect for failing to provide a hearing on
the issue of present mental condition. The court held that a trial
that results in a verdict of acquittal by reason of insanity only
determines that there is a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's
sanity at the time of the criminal act. A new finding of fact is
required for civil commitment, that is, the court must find that
defendant's mental condition currently meets the statutory criteria
for civil commitment.
To save the District of Columbia statute from constitutional
invalidity, Judge Bazelon construed the statute to authorize temporary detention of the individual for an examination to determine
whether his current mental condition necessitates civil commitment?'
Automatic, indeterminate institutionalization of defendants acquitted by reason of insanity should be ended. The following
statute should be enacted to replace the present law:
-395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
1d. at 647.
91 The New York Court of Appeals, used similar reasoning and reached similar results
in construing its mandatory commitment statute. People v. Lally, 19 N.Y.2d 27, 224 N.E.
2d 87, 277 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1966).
90

FALL

1971l]

Mental Illness

WHEN A DEFENDANT IS ACQUITTED OF A
CRIME BY REASON OF INSANITY, THE COURT
MAY ORDER HIM TRANSFERRED TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE PROBATE COURT IN THE COUNTY OF HIS RESIDENCE FOR AN EXAMINATION
AND JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF WHETHER
HE MEETS THE STATUTORY TEST FOR CIVIL
COMMITMENT. IF SO, THE INDIVIDUAL SHALL
BE HOSPITALIZED, TREATED, RELEASED, AND
DISCHARGED, IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED FOR OTHER CIVIL
PATIENTS.
The recommended statute also eliminates the possibility of
administrative placement of acquitted defendants in Ionia. The
legal and social policy considerations that argue against admission
to Ionia of allegedly "dangerous" civil patients through administrative discretion are equally applicable to persons acquitted of
crimes by reason of insanity. While it can be argued that an
insanity acquittal requires proof that the defendant committed a
criminal act, such proof is insufficient to demonstrate dangerousness of the individual to the patients or staff of the regional
hospital- the standard for transfer of civil patients to Ionia.
Special mention must be made of the inadequacy of the existing
treatment, release, and discharge provision of the insanity defense
statute 9 2 and the administrative practices promulgated thereunder.
The provision now says that a person acquitted of a crime by
reason of insanity and committed to the Department of Mental
Health for treatment in a hospital is to be discharged in accordance with the statutes governing release of patients civilly committed. The statute then provides:
The person shall not be released on convalescent care or final
discharge without first being evaluated and recommended for
93
release by the center for forensic psychiatry.
In a memorandum dated March 14, 1969, the Director of the
Department of Mental Health set forth the Department's policy
regarding not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity patients:
Such patients ... while in the hospital, have the same legal
status as patients committed by the probate courts, and the
superintendent is authorized to utilize his own best clinical
92 MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.27b (1968).

93 Id. The Center for Forensic Psychiatry is a facility of the Department of Mental
Health. The primary responsibility of the Center is performing psychiatric evaluations on
the issue of competency to stand trial for those defendants committed to the Center by the
criminal courts.
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judgment in the degree of security required. In view of the
history of criminal involvement in these cases, the avoidance
of unauthorized absence or escape is to be given priority
consideration.
Although the statute requires treatment for patients mandatorily
committed after acquittal by reason of insanity, it is apparent that
they are not treated like other civil patients. By giving priority
consideration to the prevention of escape, the Department's policy has often resulted in confinement of these patients in special
maximum security wards, even though, were they civilly committed, their mental condition would not warrant such close confinement.
Discrimination against these patients has also occurred when
they are considered for release or discharge. Although the existing
statute can clearly be construed to specify that individuals acquitted by reason of insanity are to be released from the mental
hospital when they meet criteria for release established for other
civil patients, the statutory requirement of approval by the Forensic Center prior to release has resulted in the application of
different and more stringent criteria to these patients. In a letter
dated August 17, 1970, Dr. Ames Robey, Director of the Center
for Forensic Psychiatry, stated:
The criteria applied by the Center at the present time, in
the absence of any definite statute have been as follows:
The patient may be approved for discharge when (1)
the illness of which the criminal act was a product is in
control, remission or cured; and (2) he may be certified
within the bounds of reasonable medical certainty for
the foreseeable future as no danger to the public or
himself.
It is the second part of this test that has represented
the greatest problem. Several cases are presently pending with writs of habeas corpus on the issue that the
patient is no longer mentally ill, but with the Center
holding that the risk for recidivism and danger to others
is extremely high.
Even if it were assumed that the Forensic Center is statutorily
empowered to utilize different release criteria for acquitted defendants, the criteria used are suspect. The Center may justify the
continued confinement of nonmentally ill (although allegedly dangerous) persons in regional mental hospitals by placing reliance on
the case of Ex parte Dubina.9 4 In Dubina, however, the Michigan
9

311 Mich. 482, 18 N.W.2d 902 (1945).
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Supreme Court merely affirmed the trial court's order continuing
the patient's confinement, specifically ruling that the trial court's
conclusion that the patient was currently mentally ill (insane) was
sustained by the record. The case, while discussing dangerousness
as a relevant factor in the decision to release, does not stand for
the proposition that the State can continue to confine in a mental
hospital sane, although allegedly dangerous, persons. Such a policy would transform the regional hospitals into jails for the confinement, not treatment, of noncriminals. What the State was not
able to accomplish by criminal trial, that is, the conviction and
confinement of the defendant, cannot legally be accomplished by
administrative prediction of potential future dangerousness.
The previously recommended statute, by equating mental
patients acquitted of crime by reason of insanity with other civil
mental patients in all respects-including treatment, release, and
discharge-provides the desirable alternative.
VI. "OLD-LAW"

CRIMINAL SEXUAL PSYCHOPATHS

A. Introduction
Effective August 1, 1968, the statutes by which persons were
adjudicated criminal sexual psychopaths (hereinafter CSPs) and
confined in Ionia, were repealed. Those statutes, commonly
known as the Goodrich Act, were originally enacted in 1935. 95
The Act was broadened and amended in 1937,96 declared unconstitutional by the Michigan Supreme Court in 1938, 9 7 and reenacted in modified form in 1939.98 From 1939 to 1968, the Goodrich Act was subjected to numerous legislative amendments and
court decisions. Today, persons charged with crimes who might
have been adjudicated CSPs if the Act were still in existence are
tried on the criminal charge and, if convicted, sentenced like other
convicts.9 9
When the legislature repealed the Goodrich Act, it enacted
95 No. 88 [1939] Mich. Pub. Acts.
96

No. 196 [1937] Mich. Pub. Acts.
People v. Frontczak, 286 Mich. 51, 281 N.W. 534 (1938).
No. 165 [1939] Mich. Pub. Acts.
99 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750. 10a (1968) contains a definition of the term "sexually
delinquent person." Other statutes provide that when a crime has been committed by a
person who is a "sexually delinquent person," an indeterminate sentence of one day to life
may be imposed against him. A minor crime, such as "indecent exposure" which is
punishable by a maximum of one year, theoretically may result in life imprisonment if
committed by a sexually delinquent person. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.335a (1968).
While a comprehensive discussion of the "sexually delinquent person" laws is beyond
the scope of this article, it should be noted that constitutional questions involving vagueness of terminology, due process requirements for a determination of sexual delinquency,
cruel and unusual punishment, etc., have resulted in virtual, if not total, non-use of the
"sexually delinquent person" device.
97
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Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 330.35b (Supp. 1971).100 That statute
provides for the parole and discharge of persons who have been
committed as CSPs pursuant to the Goodrich Act. The statute
authorizes the hospital superintendent to "parole" any CSP, but
stipulates:
No such person shall be' paroled unless there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has recovered from
such psychopathy and is not a menace to the safety of himself
and others .... No discharge shall be entered until such criminal sexual psychopathic person has been on parole in the
open community for a continuous period of at least 2 years
without recurrence of the criminal sexual psychopathic behavior which led to his original commitment.
There are 126 patients in the CSP category confined in Ionia.
B. ConstitutionalObjections to Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 330.35b
Article 1, section 10 of the United States Constitution prohibits
the states from passing "any ex post facto law."' 0 1 The Michigan
statute is arguably such a law. The Goodrich Act, prior to its
repeal, provided for confinement of a CSP only "until the superintendent of the institution shall have reasonable grounds to believe
that such person has recovered from such psychopathy."' 0 2 The
Department of Mental Health was statutorily empowered to release CSPs on parole, prior to discharge, under such conditions as
it deemed warranted. 10 3 However, the enactment of the new provision, by requiring complete recovery from psychopathy prior to
parole, changed not only the conditions for parole, but of necessity, the conditions for discharge. Since CSPs were entitled under
the Goodrich Act to discharge upon sufficient improvement in
mental condition at the time they were adjudicated CSPs, the
statutory change to the requirement of complete recovery cannot
be condoned.
10

No. 143 [1968] Mich. Pub. Acts.

101 The early case of Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390, IL.Ed. 648, 650 (1798), defined

ex post facto laws as:
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law; and
which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d.
Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when
committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater
punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every
law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different,
testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense,
in order to convict the offender.
102 No. 25, § 5 [1950] Mich. Pub. Acts Ex. Sess. Prior to 1950, the Goodrich Act
required full and permanent recovery. No. 165 § 5 [1939] Mich. Pub. Acts.
'03 No. 165, § 6 [1939] Mich. Pub. Acts.
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The parole provisions of the statute may also deprive CSPs of
due process of law. In addition to requiring recovery from psychopathy before parole, the statute requires that the CSP not be a
menace to the safety of himself or others. Pursuant to the Goodrich Act, a person charged with a criminal offense was adjudicated
a CSP prior to and in lieu of criminal prosecution. 10 4 Since the
CSP has never been convicted of a criminal charge, continued
institutionalization is warranted only for treatment of his psychopathic condition. By ruling that a CSP was constitutionally
entitled to a criminal trial with all its due process safeguards
before he could be confined to Jackson Prison, the Michigan
Supreme Court in In re Maddox' 05 held that CSPs were not
convicts. Therefore a statute which by its terms authorizes continued confinement of a nonconvict after recovery from the mental
condition which warranted his confinement initially, is arguably an
°6
impermissible preventive detention statute.
Even if a prediction of future dangerousness could be used to
detain a person prior to the proven commission of a criminal act,
no statutory procedure exists to insure the accuracy of that prediction, and the individual is not accorded any procedural
safeguards. For example, the phrase "menace to the safety of
himself or others" is sufficiently vague to be suspect. If a person
engages in consensual homosexual activity, is he a menace to his
own safety? To the safety of others? Does the commission of
incest menace the safety of others? Does "safety" refer to physical or psychological safety?
Even if the parole and discharge provisions of this statute were
modified, the question remains as to whether it is permissible to
continue to confine CSPs now that the Goodrich Act has been
repealed. In 1967, the Special Committee on Mental Health Legislation for Criminal Cases made its Interim Report to the Michigan House of Representatives.1 0 7 The Committee's report is a
piece of relevant legislative history on the repeal of the Act.
Among other things, the Committee was concerned with three
problems: first, the proper definition of those persons who should
104 Actually, the Goodrich Act provided for CSP adjudication of persons (1) charged
with criminal offenses, (2) convicted (or pleaded guilty) and placed on probation, or (3)
convicted (or pleaded guilty) but not yet- sentenced. No. 165 [19391 Mich. Pub. Acts.
Apparently, however, in practice the CSP adjudication was always made prior to conviction.
105 351 Mich. 358, 88 N.W.2d 470 (1958).
106 Michigan statutes require that an arrested person be taken "without unnecessary
delay" before a magistrate or other judicial officer. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 764.13,
764.26 (1968).
107

INTERIM REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON MENTAL HEALTH LEGISLATION

FOR CRIMINAL
REPORT].

CASES.

5 MICH.

HOUSE J.

115 (1967) thereinafter cited as

INTERIM
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fall within the purview of CSP legislation; second, the constitutionality of the existing Goodrich Act and the proposed revisions of the Act; and, third, the proper and adequate treatment of
CSPs.
With respect to the problem of defining CSPs, the Committee
concluded:
In general, it can be stated that the statutory and medical
concepts of the so-called psychopath are not identical, that
both are vague, that the use of an outdated psychiatric term in
a statutory test has produced confusion, and that the Goodrich Act has, as a result, been applied to a wide variety of
individuals, ranging from extremely mentally ill persons to
numerous troublesome and untreatable cases who were more
properly subjects for conventional criminal sentencing. 10 8

These doubts as to the proper definition of the term CSP create a
significant equal protection argument for persons who are still
confined as fitting within its uncertain definition. 10 9
With respect to the constitutionality of the Goodrich Act, the
Committee stated:
[The Goodrich Act] does not distinguish between minor
personality disorders and extreme psychosis. It prescribes a
civil, rather than criminal proceeding, for such persons, thereby eliminating the requirement for such basic rights as
court-appointed counsel if indigent. Yet this civil commitment
proceeding must be based on a criminal charge or conviction
and results in a criminal label being placed on the person
committed. Furthermore, the supposedly civil commitment
proceeding has no purpose in the language of the law, beyond
mere confinement; none of the many revigions made has
added a requirement that the committed person receive treatment.
On such grounds alone, the Committee is advised, it is
extremely doubtful that the Goodrich Act could survive a test
in the higher courts today.1 10
108

Id. at 121. See also

STATE OF MICHIGAN,

REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S STUDY

38 (1951). Elesewhere, The
Committee stated that the very term 'criminal sexual psychopath' might be described as
legal contradiction and a psychiatric anachronism. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 107, at
120.
109 It should also be remembered that the CSP adjudication was a civil, not a criminal,
proceeding. Today, persons who would fit within the CSP category are either civilly
committed to regional hospitals and treated like other mental patients, or they are afforded
the due process protections of a criminal trial before they are deprived of their liberty.
Arguably, the Baxstrom case requires a similar civil commitment handling for "old-law"
CSPs. As mentioned previously, they cannot be convicted of the criminal charges which
set in motion the CSP adjudication.
"0 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 107, at 120.
COMMISSION ON THE DEVIATED CRIMINAL SEX OFFENDER
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The Committee also recognized that any new or revised statute
that combines a civil commitment with a criminal charge or conviction would be subject to, the same constitutional objections.1 1
With respect to the problem of adequate treatment of CSPs, the
courts in Michigan have required treatment, even though the
Goodrich Act did not by its terms specifically mention treatment.
In 1944, twenty-two years before the landmark opinion of Judge
Bazelon in Rouse v. Cameron," 2 the Supreme Court of Michigan
mandated treatment for a CSP, stating: "It must be borne in mind
that he is not being punished, that he is an unfortunate psychopath, and that he is entitled to such treatment as his condition
requires." 1 3 Notwithstanding the repeal of the Goodrich Act, the
Court of Appeals of Michigan recently reaffirmed the right to
treatment in a case involving an "old-law" CSP. The court stated:
"We find that the right to treatment where detention is upon
commitment for a mental disorder and not upon a finding of guilt
14
on the substantive crime remains inviolate."'
As mentioned previously, the Michigan Supreme Court in 1958
ruled that since CSPs have been civilly committed and are not
convicts, a prison is not an appropriate institution for treatment." 5 Recent litigation now questions whether even Ionia is an
appropriate institution. In a lengthy and strongly worded opinion,
Judge Gilmore of the Wayne County Circuit Court recently
stated:
It is clear from the record in this case that Mr. Bargy has
not received even minimal treatment at the Ionia State Hospital, much less adequate treatment. It is shocking to consider
the record in this case and to realize that the things that have
happened to defendant could happen to a patient in a mental
hospital in Michigan in the last half of the 20th Century. Not
only has no psychiatric treatment been given him by a trained
psychiatrist, he has been subjected to the most demeaning
regulations, from being required to strip outside his room
before retiring for the night, to being confined in a
semi-correctional ward for no reason.
The lack of knowledge of patients' affairs by the physician
and psychologist in charge is shocking. The lack of qualifications by the physician in charge of the criminal sexual
psychopathic program is inexplicable. The lack of any pro"

Id. at 122.
373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
"' In re Kemmerer, 309 Mich. 313, 317- 18, 15 N.W.2d 652, 653 (1944).
114 Silvers v. People, 22 Mich. App. 1, 4, 176 N.w.2d 702, 703 (1970).
"'5 In re Maddox, 351 Mich. 388, 88 N.W.2d 470 (1958).
112
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gram to adequately treat and care for defendant is in16
humane."

Although the Department of Mental Health publicly disputed
Judge Gilmore's findings, the patient was placed on "parole"
status before a hearing could be held on whether the court should
order him transferred to a regional hospital for adequate treatment.
Even Dr. Birzgalis, Medical Superintendent of Ionia, has acknowledged the limitations of CSP treatment at Ionia:
Their treatment is difficult. Group psychotherapy is the
most essential part of the treatment program for the CSPs. It
should be continued only until the maximum benefit has been
reached. Usually that would be for not more than two to
three years because after that patients lose interest and motivation to participate and are regressing instead of progressing .... They cannot further benefit from psychiatric treatment and this hospital has to assume a more custodial role for
them. 117

C. The Dilema and Its Resolution
The proper disposition of CSPs who have received the maximum benefit from treatment available at Ionia and who are currently receiving primarily custodial confinement at that institution
is difficult to determine. Of course, those CSPs who are not
"dangerous" should either be transferred to regional hospitals for
further treatment or discharged. In recent years, Ionia has made
an effort to reduce the CSP population of the hospital by paroling
nondangerous CSPs. 1 18
As to those CSPs who, in the opinion of the Department of
Mental Health, are still "dangerous," a dilemma arises. Both Dr.
Vernon A. Stehman, Deputy Director of the Department of Mental Health, and Dr. Birzgalis are of the opinion that when CSPs
116 People v. Bargy, Case No. CR 32784, pp. 19-20 (Wayne Co. Cir. Ct., January 12,
1970).
117 Birzgalis, supra note 31, at 10. Dr. Vernon A. Stehman, Deputy Director of the
Department of Mental Health, stated on January 12, 1970:
It is not felt that further treatment at Ionia for these individuals will be of
benefit. The only reason they are still institutionalized is because of our
inability to assure the state, with reasonable certainty, that there will not be a
recurrence of the acts for which they were initially committed.
Stehman, Adequacy of Treatment- Right to Treatment 5 (1970) (unpublished manuscript
on file with the author).
1 18
The number of CSPs in Ionia was reduced from 200 on August 1, 1968, to 156 on
October 31, 1969, to 135 on January 15, 1970, to 126 on April 7, 1970, to 101 on August
17, 1970. It should be noted that few, if any, nondangerous CSPs have been transferred to
regional hospitals for treatment, even though the Department of Mental Health is statutorily authorized to treat CSPs in hospitals other than Ionia.
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cannot benefit from further psychiatric treatment, they should be
transferred to a prison setting for security and custody. 119 However logical such an approach is when applied to those individuals
who, subsequent to the repeal of the Goodrich Act, will not be
adjudicated CSPs but tried on the offense charged, this approach
simply cannot be utilized retroactively on individuals who were
adjudicated CSPs under the now-repealed Goodrich Act. As mentioned previously, the Goodrich Act itself prohibited trial or sentencing on the original criminal offense charged once the person
was adjudicated a CSP. A CSP commitment is a civil commitment, 120 and absent criminal trial and conviction, both the
Michigan Supreme Court 12 1 and the United States Supreme
Court 1 22 have prohibited confinement of civilly committed persons in a correctional institution.
The basic issue seems to be whether the State is justified in
continuing to confine in Ionia "old-law" CSPs who will not
benefit from further psychiatric treatment at that institution, when
the alternative is releasing some potentially dangerous persons
into society.
There is no ideal solution to this question. An acceptable compromise between polar positions is to repeal Mich. Comp. Laws
Ann. § 330.35b (1965) and to enact a new statute which provides:
ANY PERSON WHO HAS BEEN ADJUDICATED A
CRIMINAL SEXUAL PSYCHOPATH PURSUANT TO
THE GOODRICH ACT AND WHO IS PRESENTLY
CONFINED IN OR ON PAROLE FROM AN INSTITUTION UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH SHALL BE
DISCHARGED FROM THAT STATUS AND TRANSFERRED TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE PROBATE
COURT IN THE COUNTY OF HIS RESIDENCE FOR
AN EXAMINATION AND JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF WHETHER HE MEETS THE STATUTORY
TEST FOR CIVIL COMMITMENT. IF SO, THE INDIVIDUAL SHALL BE HOSPITALIZED, TREATED,
RELEASED, AND DISCHARGED, IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED FOR OTHER
CIVIL PATIENTS.
The following arguments are offered in support of this recom119 Stehman, supra note 117, at 5; Birzgalis, supra note 3 1. at 10- 1I.
People v. Chapnian, 301 Mich. 584, 4 N.W.2d 18 (1942).
121 in re Maddox. 351 Mich. 358, 88 N.W.2d 470 (1958).
122 Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
120
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mendation. First, society can justify continued confinement of
"old-law" CSPs only by handling them like other nonconvicts. An
attempt to continue commitment of "old-law" CSPs is certain to
be subject to extensive litigation. The result of such a "holding"
action may be a court order releasing all "old-law" CSPs.
Second, the assumption of continuing dangerousness of
"old-law" CSPs is in need of reexamination. The Special Committee considering repeal of the Goodrich Act reported:
[P]ersons committed to mental hospitals under this Act
were for the most part minor or nuisance sex offenders, while
sex criminals of the violent and dangerous variety were generally sent to prison.
Yet ironically ....the sex offender sent to Jackson was

nearly twice as likely to be paroled, within any given number
of years, as his counterpart who ended up in Ionia.
Case histories of minor offenders subjected to incredibly
long terms of confinement after being "Goodriched" into
Ionia, although presenting no real danger to the public, could
be cited but have already been repeatedly considered by
123
former study committees and commmissions.
The Special Committee's findings are still reflected in Ionia's
August 17, 1970, patient statistics.

1 24

Dr. Birzgalis once stated that the 156 CSPs in Ionia on October 31, 1969, constituted "a concentration of dangerous CSPs"
123 INTERIM REPORT,

124 Dr.

supra note 107, at 119.

Birzgalis has recently made available statistical data concerning the 101
"old-law" CSPs confined in Ionia on August 17, 1970. Letter and accompanying data from
A. A. Birzgalis, M.D., Medical Superintendent, Ionia State Hospital, August 25, 1970.
The last CSP admitted to Ionia who still remained confined in the institution as of August
17, 1970, was admitted on September 26, 1968-a total of two years of continuous
confinement. Sixty-one of the 101 patients were first admitted to the institution in 1965 or
before-a minimum of five years under the jurisdiction of the Ionia State Hospital. [This
does not necessarily mean that they have been continuously confined for the entire period.
Some were released on parole but subsequently returned to the institution.] Twenty-eight
patients were first admitted to the institution in 1960 or before-a minimum of ten years
under the jurisdiction of the Ionia State Hospital. Two patients were first admitted to the
institution in 1940-a total of thirty years under the jurisdiction of the Ionia State
Hospital. One of the individuals committed in 1940 was charged with, but not convicted of
the crime of "indecent liberties." If he had been convicted, the maximum sentence that
could have been imposed was ten years. He has been continuously confined in Ionia since
1940. The other individual committed to Ionia in 1940 was charged with, but not convicted of, the crime of "gross indecency." If he had been convicted, the maximum
sentence that could have been imposed was five years. With the exception of one day
when he appeared in court on a writ of habeas corpus, he has been continuously confined
in Ionia since 1940.
Of the 101 "old-law" CSPs, 30 had been charged with (but not convicted of) "indecent
liberties." This is by far the largest single category. Other minor sex charges included 12
charged with "gross indecency," 5 charged with "indecent exposure," and 2 charged with
incest. As to the major crimes, 6 were charged with (but not convicted of, murder, and 16
with rape (including statutory rape).
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and that they "require a long hospitalization." 1 25 Nevertheless,
within ten months of that statement, Ionia cut the CSP population
by fifty-five patients. These facts raise important questions as to
whether Ionia personnel have been and are properly determining
"dangerousness" in their decision to retain or release "old-law"
CSPs. The proposed statute, by handling CSPs as civil patients,
attempts to insure that release criteria will be applied consistently
and accurately to all patients.
Third, treatment of CSPs has to date occurred almost exclusively in Ionia. There are, however, treatment opportunities
available in the regional hospitals that are not available in Ionia.
The apparent assumption that all CSPs should be confined in
Ionia for treatment is questionable. In individual cases, treatment
in regional hospitals may be appropriate.1 26 In any event, the
proposed statute, by requiring treatment as a civil patient in a
regional hospital when warranted by the individual's mental condition, provides a middle ground between continued custodial
confinement in Ionia and absolute discharge from all confinement.
VII.

MENTALLY ILL CONVICTS

A. Transfer of Mentally Ill Convicts to IoniaProceduralSafeguards
Michigan law provides that whenever a physician at any Michigan penal institution certifies to the warden
Birzgalis, supra note 3 1, at 7.
Not all of the 101 "old-law" CSPs confined in lonia on August 17, 1970, have been
diagnosed as "psychopaths." Thirteen patients have been diagnosed as suffering from
schizophrenia and 2 have been diagnosed as mentally retarded. Letter and accompanying
data from A. A. Birzgalis, M.D. Medical Superintendent, Ionia State Hospital, August 25,
1970. Interestingly, the Goodrich Act specifically excluded "feebleminded" persons from
the CSP definition. No. 165, § 1 [1939] Mich. Pub. Acts. Over one-half of the patients in
the regional hospitals have been diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia [Of the 13,944
patients in the regional hospitals during the fiscal year 1967-68, 7,325 were diagnosed as
suffering from schizophrenia. Raw data supplied by Mr. James Foster, Associate Director
of Operations Analysis and Research Division, Michigan Department of Mental Health,
April 29, 1970.], and this writer would anticipate no overwhelming difficulty in placing 13
similarly diagnosed individuals into those hospitals. Similarly, the 2 mentally retarded
"CSPs" could be handled in the state home and training schools.
As to the remaining 86 CSPs, New York's recent experience may be illuminating. When
Operation Baxstrom required the transfer of ex-convict mental patients from Dannemora
to the regional hospitals, Central Islip State Hospital received 72 patients. That hospital
changed 13 diagnoses, the most significant being the reclassification of 9 diagnoses from
"psychosis with psychopathic personality" to "schizophrenia." The change in diagnosis
was explained as reflecting "the general trend in nosological classification, which avoids
the diagnosis of psychopathy as a catch-all that is of little value as a descriptive term."
White, Krumholz, & Fink, supra-note 19, at 38. These patients presented no unique
problems for the staff of the civil hospital. Id.
As to those "old-law" CSPs who cannot be reclassified to other psychiatric classifications, it should be noted that in the 1967- 1968 fiscal year, the regional hospitals treated
269 patients diagnosed as suffering from "personality disorders." Raw data supplied by
'2
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that any inmate therein is insane, it shall be the duty of such
officer in charge to make immediately a full examination into
the condition of such inmate, and if fully satisfied that he is
insane, such officer in charge, where said inmate is confined,
shall forthwith cause such inmate to be transferred to the
27
Ionia state hospital.'
There are 112 patients in this category confined in Ionia.
This statute is objectionable in that, first, it authorizes an administrative determination of mental illness; and, second, it requires that all mentally ill convicts transferred to the Department
of Mental Health for treatment of their illnesses be confined in
Ionia.
Although there is no Michigan case law concerning the type of
procedural safeguards required prior to the transfer of mentally ill
convicts to Ionia, recent appellate cases in New York and the
District of Columbia indicate the developing trend. Prior to 1962,
the New York statutes for transfer of mentally ill convicts to
Dannemora and Matteawan state hospitals were virtually identical to the existing Michigan statute. In People ex rel. Brown v.
Johnston,1 2 8 a mentally ill convict challenged the validity of his
administrative transfer into Dannemora. The New York Court of
Appeals ruled:
Although under ordinary circumstances a mere transfer (as
distinguished from a commitment for insanity) is purely an
administrative matter, and a prisoner has no standing to
choose the place in which he is to be confined, we do not feel
that the court should sanction, without question, removals, in
cases of alleged insane prisoners, which can conceivably be
uncontrolled and arbitrary.
The issue here is... whether the courts below may properly refuse to even inquire into the nature of his condition and
the possibility that [the prisoner] may be illegally confined
with deranged persons who are liable to harm and/or adversely affect him. 129
The Brown decision signaled the end of administrative transfers of
mentally ill convicts in New York.
30
In United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold,1
the Second

Mr. James Foster, Associate Director of Operations Analysis and Research Division,
Michigan Department of Mental Health, April 29, 1970. A psychopath (sociopath) is a
person suffering from a personality disorder.
127 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.66 (1967).

1289 N.Y.2d 482, 174 N.E.2d 725, 215 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1961).

129 Id. at 484-85, 174 N.E.2d at 726, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
130410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir. 1969).
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Circuit reiterated' the holding of the Brown case and defined the
procedural safeguards required prior to transfer. The court
phrased the problem as follows:
[W]e are faced with the obvious but terrifying possibility
that the transferred prisoner may not be mentally ill at all.
Yet he will be confined with men who are not only mad but
dangerously so. As the New York Courts have themselves
indicated, he will be exposed to physical, emotional and general mental agony. Confined with those who are insane, told
repeatedly that he too is insane and indeed treated as insane,
it does not take much for a man to succumb to some mental
13 1
aberration.
The court concluded that mentally ill convicts are entitled to the
same procedural safeguards as are provided in civil commitment
proceedings, including proper examination, a hearing upon notice,
13 2
periodic review of the need for commitment, and trial by jury.
3 3 the Court of Appeals
In Matthews v. Hardy,1
for the District
of Columbia examined the stigma attached to persons who are
"twice-cursed" as mentally ill and criminal, the numerous restric-.
tions and routines imposed on mental patients in a mental hospital
that would not be imposed on a convict in prison, and the possibility that a convict transferred to a mental hospital might be
incarcerated for a longer time than if he remained in prison, and
concluded:
We think the differences in the two types of incarceration
are simply too great to treat transfer [of a convict] to a mental
hospital as a routine administrative procedure. The consequences of a mistake are sufficiently great to warrant giving
13 4
prisoners the same protections as non-prisoners receive.
The logic of the Brown, Schuster, and Matthews cases is compelling. Michigan should adopt a statute requiring that before
prisoners can be involuntarily admitted to a mental hospital they
must be accorded the same procedural safeguards accorded mentally ill noncriminals. As a first step, the present statutory policy
which provides for administrative placement of mentally ill prisoners into Ionia should be abandoned.
B. Treatment of Mentally Ill Convicts-A Proposal
In the historic movement to dissociate mentally ill persons from
criminals, the pendulum has swung. too far. Since society autho13 1
Id.
32

at 1078.
1 1d.at 1073.
133 420 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
134 Id. at 611 .

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 5":1

rizes the involuntary treatment of seriously mentally ill persons,
all persons who are seriously mentally ill are entitled to equal
treatment regardless of any other status, such as "criminal," that
has been attached to them.
The Brown, Schuster, and Matthews cases did more than merely recognize the right of nonmentally ill prisoners to attack administrative determinations of mental illness and consequent placement in a mental hospital. There is language in the cases suggesting that convicts who are admittedly mentally ill must be treated
like nonconvict mentally ill persons. For example, in Brown the
New York Court of Appeals emphasized that
any further restraint in excess of that permitted by the judgment or constitutional guarantees should be subject to inquiry. An individual, once validly convicted and placed under
the jurisdiction of the Department of Correction... is not to
be divested of all rights and unalterably abandoned and for35
gotten by the remainder of society.1
The court's assertion that convicted sentence-serving convicts are
not divested of all their rights questions the validity of transferring
mentally ill convicts to a maximum security mental hospital such
as Ionia. Confinement in Ionia without the opportunity for adequate treatment at a regional hospital may be viewed as a "further
restraint" in excess of constitutional guarantees.
When a prisoner becomes physically ill, his illness is treated in
the prison itself. However, the unique nature of serious mental
illness requires interruption of a prisoner's confinement and transfer to a mental hospital or psychiatric ward for treatment of that
illness. Under this circumstance, there is no valid basis for distinguishing between the treatment accorded him and the treatment
accorded other mentally ill individuals. The typical civil mental
patient is hospitalized in a regional mental hospital for only two
months. Mentally ill convicts, forced to undergo treatment at
Ionia, average two and one-half years of confinement at that
institution.' 36 The obvious disparity in treatment potential can
only be explained by the convict's status as a "criminal." However, proper treatment for mental illness depends not on the
patient's status, but on considerations of the diagnosis and pathology of the individual's illness.
No person convicted of a crime is sent directly to Ionia. The
statute 3 7 presumes that the convict will have been sent initially
135 People ex rel. Brown v. Johnston, 9 N.Y.2d 482, 485, 174 N.E.2d 725, 726, 215
44, 45-46 (1961).
N.Y.S.2d
1 36
DMH-PRELIMINARY PROSPECTUS, supra note 28, at 12.
7

13" MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.66 (1967).
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to a prison from which the mental commitment process originates.
The law assumes that the mental illness that required removal
from the prison environment "developed" while the convict was
confined within the prison. Because of this change in mental
condition, the convict is no longer the person he was at the time
he committed the crime, and, until his mental illness subsides, he
is no longer a fit subject for punishment. His criminal status
should dissolve, albeit temporarily, and he should be treated like
any other mental patient. The possible need for security does not
logically depend on a "criminal" label that preceded the patient's
mental illness. A criminal may be regarded as a person who is too
dangerous to live in society, and for this reason, society may
require his confinement in prison. But when the sentence-serving
criminal is transferred out of the prison for purposes of treatment,
the question of "dangerousness" becomes relevant only to the
mental hospital, not to the community. Nevertheless, in an obvious inconsistency, Michigan law imposes a maximum security
confinement on all its mentally ill convicts by permitting transfer
from prison only to Ionia.
Of course, mental illness in convicts does not necessarily develop after confinement in prison. Many mentally ill persons are
convicted of crimes daily. In some instances the commission of
the crime was a manifestation of underlying mental illness. The
important point, however, is that the determination of whether a
mentally ill convict requires maximum security confinement cannot be made by an analysis of when the illness developed.
It has never been determined that convicts suffer from
differents kinds of mental illnesses than persons who are civilly
committed. A nonconvict who becomes sufficiently mentally ill
may be committed to a mental hospital because he also is too
dangerous to live in society. Whether security measures will be
imposed on a civil mental patient is determined by the inability of
the patient to comprehend and respect the rights of other patients,
hospital staff, and the community should he escape. These considerations, which depend upon the pathology and severity of the
particular illness, are the only rational considerations and should
be applied to "criminal" mental patients as well.
For all of the above reasons, mentally ill convicts should receive the same opportunity to be treated in the regional hospitals
as is received by civilly committed mental patients. Moreover,
requiring maximum security confinement of a mentally ill convict
in Ionia when it is neither necessary nor therapeutically desirable
may constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme
Court implicitly recognized the soundness of this position in.Rob-
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inson v. California.13 8 In holding a California statute uncon-

stitutional for punishing persons on the basis of their status as
drug addicts, the Court analogized drug addiction to mental illness. Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, stated:
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history would
attempt to make it a criminal offense for a person to be
mentally ill....
To be sure, imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the
abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual. But
the question cannot be considered in the abstract. Even one
day in prison would be cruel and unusual punishment for the
"crime" of having a common cold. 139
Confinement of a mentally ill convict in a maximum security
institution like Ionia without a determination of the need for such
security based on the considerations of the illness is, in effect,
punishment for the convict's mental illness. This cannot be constitutionally condoned. Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in Robinson, reasoned that a mentally ill person must be treated as a sick
person 1 40 and added:

We would forget the teachings of the Eighth Amendment if
we allowed sickness to be made a crime and permitted sick
people to be punished for being sick. This age of enlightenment cannot tolerate such barbarous action. 14'
In light of the potential litigation involving the constitutional
validity of "segregating" mentally ill convicts from other mentally
ill persons and affording them inferior treatment for their mental
conditions, the lack of moral and psychiatric justification for such
policy, and the expressed willingness of the Department of Mental Health to treat mentally ill criminals in the regional hospitals, 1 42 the present statute should be replaced by a statutory

policy which provides:
MENTALLY ILL CONVICTS WHOSE MENTAL
CONDITIONS MEET THE CRITERIA FOR CIVIL
COMMITMENT SHALL BE ADMITTED TO,
TREATED AT, RELEASED AND DISCHARGED
FROM REGIONAL MENTAL HOSPITALS IN AC138

370 U.S. 660 (1962).

139
140

Id. at 666- 67.
Id. at 674.
Id. at 678.

141
142

The Michigan Department of Mental Health has stated that from the viewpoint of the
mental health specialist "there is no valid psychiatric reason for isolating mentally ill

criminal offenders from other mentally ill patients ..
supra note 26, at I. For a similar conclusion, see

" DMH-PRELIMINARY

MEDICAL AUDIT,

PROSPECTUS,

supra note 30, at 5.
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CORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED
FOR OTHER MENTAL PATIENTS.
New problems and new questions are posed by this recommendation. In the following portion of this article, an attempt is made
to resolve these issues, offering one approach to the implementation of the proposal.
VIII. THE FUTURE OF IONIA
A. Introduction
The Ionia State Hospital Medical Audit Committee, citing the
lack of a valid psychiatric reason for isolating mentally ill criminals from other mentally ill patients and "the inherent and practically insolvable problems associated with the Ionia State Hospital," 143 made the following recommendation:
Ionia State Hospital should be phased out insofar as its
present function is concerned. The responsibility for treating
mentally ill offenders should be decentralized to the Regional
State Mental Hospitals in accordance with the concept of the
Community Mental Health Centers. Patients who cannot be
discharged from the Ionia State Hospital should be treated
the same as other patients to the extent possible. The necessary changes in the State statutes should be made to permit
144
this change.

Although the Medical Audit Committee discussed possible improvements in the short-term operation of Ionia, the Committee
was adamant in its recommendation to phase out Ionia.'45
In January 1966, the Department of Mental Health expressly
concurred with the long-range phase out of Ionia recommended
by the Medical Audit Committee.14 6 The Department cited the
heterogeneous collection of persons committed to Ionia and the
legal controls imposed as making it impossible to establish a
program within that hospital appropriate to the needs of all the
47
patients.
The Mental Health Committee of the House of Representatives in its February 17, 1966, Report to the Legislature, recog143 MEDICAL AUDIT, supra note 30, at 5.
144 Id.
145In discussing short-term improvements, the Committee underscored the following,
"However, it is hoped that this discussion will not serve to encourage the continued
operation
of the hospital." Id. at 7.
46
1

DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL

HEALTH,

A SPECIAL REPORT ON THE PROGRAM AND

ASSIGNMENT OF THE IONIA STATE HOSPITAL, INCLUDING RECOMMENDATION

DIATE AND LONG-RANGE CHANGES 2 (January 1966).

147 Id. at 4.

FOR IMME-
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nizing that responsibility for treating mentally ill offenders should
be decentralized to the regional state mental hospitals, recommended "[tihat immediate legislative and administrative steps be
taken to terminate the present function of the Ionia State Hospital
as an institution solely for the treatment of the criminal mentally
ill. 1 48
Two problems need to be explored and resolved before Ionia
can be phased out. First, are the regional hospitals currently able
to handle an influx of Ionia's mental patients, and, if not, can the
regional hospitals be restructured to accommodate them without
imposing a significant cost or burden? Second, what should be
done with the buildings that now constitute the Ionia State Hospital; can they be utilized realistically for a new public mission? It
would appear that an affirmative answer can be given to both
questions.
B. Treatment of the Ionia PatientPopulation in
the Regional Hospitals
In deciding whether Ionia's patient population can be moved to
the regional hospitals, it should first be noted that not all Ionia
patients are necessarily both mentally ill and dangerous. For
example, the existing statute requires that all convicts transferred
to the Department of Mental Health be treated in Ionia without
regard to their danger or lack of it.149 Furthermore, this article has
repeatedly focused on the question of whether administrative
placement of patients without judicial scrutiny results in maximum security confinement "too easily" in some cases. All
patients currently in Ionia have been placed there through the
exercise of the administrative discretion of the Department of
Mental Health. Many of these patients may not be truly "dangerous" and could be transferred to and handled adequately in
regional hospitals.
There is some data available indicating that the regional hospitals are currently able to handle Ionia's case load without a major
reorganization of their structures and operations. The following
evidence supports that conclusion:
(1) From July 1961 to December 31, 1964, all patients confined in Ionia for at least six months were reevaluated in staff
conferences. This process resulted in the discharge of 987
patients from Ionia. Of this number, 222 patients were transferred

148 MENTAL HEALTH COMMITTEE,

A

REPORT OF THE MENTAL

TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE AND THE 73RD LEGISLATURE
149 MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN.

§ 330.66 (1967).

HEALTH COMMITTEE

5 (February 17, 1966).

FALL

197 1]

Mental Illness

to the civil mental hospitals. 150 These hospitals were able to
absorb this large number of Ionia patients without significant
difficulty.
(2) Since 1967, the regional hospitals have been receiving
patients found incompetent to stand trial. In the period of July 1,
1967, to June 30, 1970, the Department of Mental Health reported that 173 incompetent defendant patients have been admitted to
regional hospitals, while only 133 have been admitted to Ionia.
Although concern over deficiencies in regional hospital treatment
of incompetent defendant patients has been expressed,' 5 1 at least
the personnel of the regional hospitals have become more familiar
with the problems in treating these "criminal" order patients.
(3) While the regional hospitals have, in recent years, become
more open and permissive, they are still capable of offering considerable security when patients' conditions warrant. For example, the percentage of patients on open wards in the six regional hospitals on February 28, 1970, was:' 5 2
Regional Hospital
Kalamazoo
Newberry
Northville
Pontiac
Traverse City
Ypsilanti

% of Patients on Open Wards
24.4
44.0
7.7
43.7
33.8
39.0

The closed wards in the regional hospitals may offer the only
security needed for many of Ionia's patients. As noted by the
Ionia Medical Audit Committee, there is a distinction between
"need for control" and "dangerousness." Many of Ionia's patients
need some kind of security because of their own psychological
deficiencies. Others need security because they are truly dangerous. These two classes should be handled in very different
53
ways.'
Birzgalis, supra note 31, at 2.
151 See text accompanying notes 62-72 supra.
152 Raw data supplied by Mr. James Foster, Associate Director of Operations Analysis
and Research Division, Michigan Department of Mental Health, April 29, 1970.
153 MEDICAL AUDIT, supra note 30, at 18.
The regional hospitals currently utilize mechanical restraint or seclusion for the more
dangerous or disturbed patients. As of February 28, 1970, the regional hospitals reported
the following average daily number of patients in restraint or seclusion:
150

Regional Hospital
Kalamazoo
Newberry

Average Daily Number in
Restraint or Seclusion
10.0
6.0
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(4) Through an emergency civil commitment procedure, the
regional hospitals regularly receive patients who are as dangerous
as any patients confined in Ionia.1 54 The Department of Mental
Health has experienced little difficulty in handling these patients
in the regional hospitals. Ionia's patients should not be deprived
of the opportunity for regional hospital psychiatric treatment
when many of them have not even manifested homicidal or other
dangerous tendencies.
Even if it were assumed that a substantial portion of Ionia's
patient population is both mentally ill and dangerous and that
some restructuring of the regional hospitals would be necessary to
accommodate these patients, such restructuring would be warranted. The Bar Association of the City of New York has contrasted the central high-security facility concept with the regional
facility concept and has found that the latter offered a more
desirable approach to confinement and treatment of dangerous
mental patients. The Bar Association found that a central security
institution accepting patients on a statewide basis: (1) impedes
visiting and social work; (2) is inconsistent with the localized
approach to hospitalization; (3) involves severe restrictions upon
the patient's freedom; and (4) carries with it a stigma of dan15 5
gerousness.
By comparison, the Bar Association found that the establishment of high-security wards at the regional hospitals, while not
being a costly procedure, did offer several distinct advantages:
Existing facilities designed for the care and custody of
patients only temporarily dangerously mentally ill could be
adapted to the needs of longer-term patients. This solution
would avoid the geographic drawbacks of a central institution, as well as the probable stigma associated with it. It
is possible, moreover, that gradual reintegration of the patient
into the rest of the hospital population might be more easily
accomplished for patients recovering from long-term danNorthville
2.2
Pontiac
17.5
Traverse City
5.0
Ypsilanti
12.0
Ionia reported a daily average of 0.6 patients in restraint or seclusion. Raw data
supplied by Mr. James Foster, Associate Director of Operations Analysis and Research
Division, Michigan Department of Mental Health, April 29, 1970.
154 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.19 (1967) authorizes the emergency admission of "a
person believed to be mentally ill manifesting homicidal or other dangerous tendencies."
This provision was recently amended by No. 13, § 1 [1969] Mich. Pub. Acts, which
emphasized that the purpose of emergency admission is psychiatric treatment. The Department of Mental Health strongly supported this amendment.
155 N.Y. BAR REPORT, supra note 20, at 66.
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gerous mental illness than would be possible by retransfer to
an "open door" hospital from a central institution with maximum security throughout. We recognize that the need for
sustained security, even though only partial, would be generally out of character for "open door" institutions. However, if
the department is properly to be charged with full responsibility for the hospitalization of all civil patients, an accomand custodial needs of all its
modation suiting the medical
56
reached.'
be
must
patients
Nevertheless, the establishment of maximum security wards
within the regional hospitals should not be viewed as an end in
itself, for it is not desirable to perpetuate the problems that have
plagued Ionia by creating "little lonias" within the regional hospitals. The purpose of hospitalization is treatment. Even when
security measures must be undertaken because of a patient's
mental condition, the emphasis of the hospital should remain on

treatment, not on security. The creation of maximum security
wards in regional hospitals is justified only as an adjunct to providing treatment to all mental patients within the hospital.
Certain measures should be undertaken to insure that the creation of maximum security wards in regional hospitals results in
more, not less, treatment for the hospitals' patients. The District
of Columbia recently faced the problem of providing adequate
treatment for patients confined within the maximum security
wards of its hospital. The Ad Hoc Committee for the Evaluation
of Security Programs and Facilities at Saint Elizabeths Hospital
reported:
The security facilities seem to be islands of autonomy,
hardly linked to each other and markedly shielded from the
rest of the Hospital. They hardly share each other's resources
and seem deprived from sharing those from the Hospital at
large .... A semiautonomous status of security services
would facilitate implementation of those matters largely peculiar to the section, e.g., relationships to law enforcement
agencies and the courts. Integration of clinical services
should be accomplished to the end that all treatment modalities within Saint Elizabeths Hospital will likewise be
available for the security patients.
In other words, the separation of so-called "criminally insane," in a special unit separate and apart from the rest of the
patient population at Saint Elizabeths Hospital, should be
considered as a temporary and transitional measure which
156 Id. at 68.
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eventually will lead towards complete integration of both
groups of patients within a uniform and therapeutic hospital
57
program.1
If the suggestion for integration of clinical services is adopted
by the Michigan Department of Mental Health, no statutory
change is necessary to insure adequate treatment for those
patients who have been confined in maximum security wards of
the regional hospitals. However, a question remains whether
procedural safeguards should be accorded patients before they are
transferred into the maximum security ward. Ordinarily, the
movement of a patient from ward to ward within a single institution is essentially a medical matter. However, where a particular ward (maximum security ward of a regional hospital) is
functionally distinct from other wards and placement there involves added risks and increased restraints on personal liberty,
the patient should be protected against arbitrary transfers. The
recommendations made previously 158 for the elimination of administrative placement of dangerous civil patients into Ionia
should be made applicable to this situation. Specifically, statutes
should be adopted to provide:
I. PRIOR TO THE TRANSFER OF ANY PATIENT
IN A REGIONAL HOSPITAL TO A MAXIMUM SECURITY WARD WITHIN THAT OR ANOTHER HOSPITAL, A JUDICIAL HEARING SHALL BE REQUIRED AND JUDICIAL APPROVAL SHALL BE OBTAINED. THE PATIENT SHALL RECEIVE PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS INCLUDING, BUT NOT
NECESSARILY LIMITED TO: NOTICE OF THE ALLEGATION, RIGHT TO COUNSEL, RIGHT TO INDEPENDENT PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION (AT
THE STATE'S EXPENSE IF THE INDIVIDUAL IS INDIGENT), RIGHT TO CONFRONT AND
CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES, AND THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. THE BURDEN OF PROOF THAT THE INDIVIDUAL MEETS
THE STATUTORY CRITERIA FOR TRANSFER
SHALL BE PLACED ON THE STATE. ADDITIONALLY, THE STATE SHALL BEAR THE BURDEN OF
EXPLORING POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO
'r' Ad Hoc Committee for the Evaluation of Security Programs and Facilities at Saint
Elizabeths Hospital, The Evaluation of Security Programs and Facilities at Saint Elizabeths Hospital (1968) as found in Appendix to Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 633
(D.C.
Cir. 1969).
5
' a See text accompanying notes 35-43 supra.
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TRANSFER (THAT IS, THE STATE
FORCED TO PROVE THAT NO LESS
TERNATIVE, SUCH AS INCREASED
TRANQUILIZERS IS APPROPRIATE
DIVIDUAL'S CASE.)

SHOULD BE
DRASTIC ALDOSAGE OF
TO THE IN-

2. NO PATIENT SHALL BE TRANSFERRED TO A
MAXIMUM SECURITY WARD UNLESS THE REGIONAL HOSPITAL PROVES BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE PATIENT, WHILE A
PATIENT IN THE REGIONAL HOSPITAL, COMMITTED AN ACT OR ACTS WHICH HAVE RESULTED IN, OR IF CONTINUED WILL NECESSARILY RESULT IN, SERIOUS BODILY INJURY OR
DEATH TO OTHER PATIENTS OR HOSPITAL PERSONNEL AND THAT THERE WAS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR SUCH BEHAVIOR. FURTHER, THE HOSPITAL MUST PROVE THAT IT HAS UNDERTAKEN
ALL REASONABLE EFFORTS TO PREVENT REOCCURRENCE OF THE CONDUCT AND THAT SUCH
EFFORTS HAVE FAILED TO DETER THE PATIENT
AND THAT THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT
THE PATIENT'S INJURIOUS CONDUCT WILL CONTINUE AND BE REPEATED IN THE FUTURE.
3. NO PATIENT ADMITTED INTO A MAXIMUM
SECURITY WARD SHALL BE RETAINED IN MAXIMUM SECURITY CONFINEMENT FOR LONGER
THAN SIX MONTHS EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY
COURT ORDER AT INTERVALS OF SIX MONTHS
GRANTED AFTER NOTICE TO THE PATIENT AND
AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEMAND A HEARING AS
HEREINAFTER PROVIDED.
IF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE REGIONAL
HOSPITAL DETERMINES THAT ANY PATIENT ADMITTED TO A MAXIMUM SECURITY WARD REQUIRES RETENTION IN MAXIMUM SECURITY
CONFINEMENT BECAUSE OF DANGEROUS MENTAL ILLNESS, HE SHALL APPLY WITHIN SIX
MONTHS OF THE PATIENT'S ADMISSION FOR AN
ORDER AUTHORIZING
RETENTION. THE
PATIENT SHALL BE NOTIFIED OF THE APPLICATION AND GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO
DEMAND A HEARING. THE PATIENT SHALL BE
ACCORDED ALL PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
ACCORDED AT THE PREVIOUS HEARING [See recommendation 1 supra]. THE STANDARD FOR RETENTION SHALL BE THE SAME FOR INITIAL ADMIS-
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SION TO THE MAXIMUM SECURITY WARD [See recommendation 2 supra]. THE COURT MAY ORDER RETENTION OF THE PATIENT (WHEN THE STANDARD IS MET) FOR A PERIOD NOT TO EXCEED
SIX MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE ORDER.
FURTHER ORDERS FOR CONTINUED RETENTION MAY BE APPLIED FOR AND ORDERED AS
ABOVE.

C. A New Mission for lonia
There appears to be little agreement about the future function
of Ionia. The Ionia Medical Audit Committee, while recommending a phase out of Ionia's security function, made no recommendation as to the prospective use of the institution. 15 9 The Committee, among other things, noted that the hospital's physical plant
was not conducive to modern psychiatric therapy. 160 Nevertheless, the Mental Health Committee of the House of Representatives recommended that Ionia continue as a facility of the Department of Mental Health with a change from its special role as
an essentially correctional insititution to a general psychiatric
hospital of approximately 800 to 900 beds.' 61 The Department of
Mental Health recently expressed its plans for Ionia as follows:
Pending further changes in the law or the development of
new facilities and programs, the Department plans to continue to use the Ionia State Hospital as its security facility, and
as its resident load declines, use the resulting space for the
care and treatment of long-term care mentally ill patients
selected and transferred from other hospitals. In the longer
range and after the security functions of this hospital have
been closed out, the hospital plant may well be used for both
162
mentally ill and/or mentally retarded patients.
Proposals to transform Ionia into a regional hospital should be
rejected. The institution is located in an extremely remote and
isolated part of the State. It is difficult to recruit doctors and other
personnel, and the institution has no natural patient catchment
district. Visitation by relatives poses obvious difficulties.
Proposals to continue Ionia as a maximum security mental
hospital should also be rejected. If in the future security measures
159 MEDICAL AUDIT, supra note 30, at 4.
160 Id. at 29.
161 MENTAL HEALTH COMMITTEE, supra note 148, at 6.
162

DMH-PRELIMINARY PROSPECTUS, supra note 28, at 8.

FALL

197 1]

Mental Illness

are imposed on a patient only when necessitated by his mental
condition and not because of some "criminal" status, there would
not be a sufficient number of dangerous mental patients to warrant
the continued existence of a single maximum-security mental institution. The Ionia Medical Audit Committee estimated that a
facility with about 200 beds would serve the maximum security
needs of the State. 163 In addition, the previously mentioned problem of the availability (or lack thereof) of treatment opportunities
to patients confined in a single maximum-security institution must
be considered. Confinement of dangerous patients within maximum security wards of regional hospitals seems to be a more
desirable alternative.
The crux of the problem concerning the future function of Ionia
is found with the mentally ill convict. The proposal to treat him
within the regional hospitals is likely to be viewed as "revolutionary." However, such treatment seems logical when several factors
are considered. First, the characteristics of today's mentally ill
convict are substantially different from those of the mentally ill
convict of several years ago. Dr. Fred J. Pesetsky, Director of the
Michigan Corrections Psychiatric Clinic, has observed that the
type of convict received into the Department of Corrections has
dramatically changed from a prevalence of professional criminals to a preponderance of emotionally disturbed youthful
offenders whose criminal behavior is more an expression of
social and emotional turbulence rather than a criminal career
16 4
orientation.
The statistics confirm his observation. Of the 3,849 individuals
committed to correctional facilities in 1969, 2,056 were in the
fifteen to twenty-four age group; 733 were in the fifteen to nineteen age group.1

65

163MEDICAL AUDIT, supra note 30, at 33. The Department of Mental Health has
accepted and utilized this figure. DMH-PRELIMINARY PROSPECTUS, supra note 28, at 13.
164 Pesetsky, The Corrections Specialist, A New Discipline, CORRECTIONS Q. 15, 17
(February 1969).
1r5 STATE OF MICH. DEP'T. OF CORRECTIONS, 1969 CRIMINAL STATISTICS, Table B2
(1970).
All male convicts received by the Department of Corrections are evaluated initially in
the Reception-Diagnostic Center. The Center is attached to the State Prison of Southern
Michigan (Jackson Prison), but operated as a separate unit. The Reception-Diagnostic
Center examined 4,452 convicts in 1969 and found the following mental problems:
77 convicts were classified as psychotic (mentally ill)
194 convicts were classified as mentally retarded;
355 convicts were classified as alcholics;
491 convicts were classified as narcotic addicts;
602 convicts were classified as having a character disorder;
1,357 convicts were classified as having a character defect.
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As to "treatment" within the general prison confines, Dr.
Pesetsky has stated:
The organization of [penal] institutions that was predicated
upon servicing the needs of older professional offenders offers
little in therapeutic programming and handling techniques to
meet the needs of the younger offender. The problems of
youth, and particularly the emotionally disturbed, require the
rapid advancement of specialized techniques, programs, and
personnel that are only being developed in very limited fash1 66
ion in corrections departments throughout our nation.
The Michigan Corrections Psychiatric Clinic was established in
1953 as a treatment facility for mentally disturbed inmates.
Though located at Jackson Prison, the Clinic serves as a "department of mental health" for the entire Department of Corrections.
The workable capacity of the Clinic is sixty-five and the maximum capacity is seventy-one patients. The Clinic employs no
full-time psychiatrists; in fact, the Clinic employs no full-time
physicians (M.D.'s). The Clinic utilizes the services of a psychiatric consultant and a psychology consultant. However, in the
period of July 1967 through June 1968, total consultation hours
16 7
averaged less than nine and one-half hours per week.
The Clinic is not only inadequate in size and professional
staffing, but also in the quality of treatment it provides. For
example, the Clinic relies heavily on inmate personnel for its
nursing attendants. 16 8 The Clinic is essentially a short term facility, and patients who demand extensive treatment are reassigned
to one of the several residential wards within the prison. Only if
the patient remains disfunctional while on this "outpatient" status,
is he transferred to the Ionia State Hospital.1 6 9 In the last five
years, transfers of mentally ill convicts to Ionia have averaged
only thirty-one per year. This hardly seems an appropriate figure
in light of the conspicuous inadequacies in treatment available in
the Department of Corrections.
On the other hand, if large numbers of mentally ill convicts
were transferred to the Department of Mental Health, the Department would be overwhelmed with many convicts who are unData supplied by Mr. Maurice J. Keyser, Psychologist, Reception-Diagnostic Center, May
8, 1970.
166 Pesetsky, supra note 164, at 17.
167 Pesetsky, The Michigan Corrections Psychiatric Clinic 2 (undated) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the author).
168
Id. at 12.
9
16 Id. at 14.
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treatable by known psychiatric means and with available psychiatric resources. For example, regarding just one psychiatric
problem, Dr. Anderson has stated that many if not most habitual
criminals could be labeled "sociopaths."' 170 Dr. Alexander P. Dukay, Superintendent of Ypsilanti State Hospital, has indicated that
perhaps 80 percent of the inmates of Jackson Prison are socio71
paths.'
The question of "How many convicts have a psychiatric problem?" should not be determinative. The real issue is: "Should
those convicts who have psychiatric problems that are treatable
by known psychiatric means available in the regional hospitals be
deprived of this treatment opportunity merely because they have
been convicted of crimes?"
For all of the above reasons, Ionia State Hospital should be
converted into a Center for the Psychiatric Diagnosis and Evaluation of Convicts. The following examples are offered as illustrative of the services such a Center could provide.
First, the Ionia Center could be utilized to diagnose and evaluate for transfer to regional hospitals, those convicts sent to it by
the Department of Corrections facilities. Similarly, the Center
could evaluate those convicts sent to it by the regional hospitals
for possible return to prison.
Second, Ionia Center personnel could regularly visit the correctional facilities of the State for the purpose of screening convicts
for possible transfer for psychiatric treatment.
Third, the Ionia Center could operate a psychiatric clinic within
the facilities of the Department of Corrections. Alternatively,
Ionia Center personnel could provide consulting and staff-training
services to a psychiatric clinic operated by the Department of
Corrections.
Fourth, the Ionia Center could perform competency to stand
trial and other psychiatric evaluations currently performed by the
Center for Forensic Psychiatry. Perhaps the Forensic Center

American Psychiatry Association, Standard Nomenclature (1952), as found in J.
J. GOLDSTEIN, & A. DERSHOWITZ, PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY & LAWS, 513
(1967), defines "Sociopathic Personality Disturbance" as follows:
Individuals to be placed in this category are ill primarily in terms of society
and of conformity with the prevailing cultural milieu, and not only in terms of
personal discomfort and relations with other individuals. However, sociopathic reactions are very often symptomatic of severe underlying personality
disorder, neurosis, or psychosis, or occur as the result of organic brain injury
or disease.
170

KATZ,

171 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 107, at 121.
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functions and staff could be incorporated into the lonia Center
72
with a broader conceptual and statutory base.'
Fifth, the Ionia Center could be used to perform evaluations of
convicts after conviction but before sentencing. The Final Draft
of the Revised Criminal Code contains a similar provision authorizing a criminal court to commit a convicted defendant to the
Forensic Center or other diagnostic center of the Department of
Mental Health for such an evaluation. 173 The Ionia Center should
be authorized to recommend civil commitment in lieu of correc74
tional confinement in appropriate cases.'
Sixth, the Ionia Center could be utilized to resolve, on a
case-by-case basis, the difficult problem of handling mentally ill
convicts in the regional hospitals. For example, if a mentally ill
convict is considered to be a civil patient in all respects, does he
have a right to be released from the hospital on convalescent
care? If so, should he be released to the community or returned to
prison? If the fact of institutionalization in a prison was the
precipitating cause of a convict's mental illness, would not returning him to that same institutional environment be psychiatrically
harmful? If institutional life itself initially caused a convict's mental illness, should he be transferred from one institution (prison) to
another (mental hospital) or should he be treated solely on an
outpatient basis? There are no answers to these questions that can
be uniformly applied to all mentally ill convicts.
Finally, the Ionia Center could conduct research on some of
the ultimate, and largely unexplored questions of deviant behavior. The "sphere of influence" of the mental health professional
should not remain entirely detached from the "sphere of
influence" of the corrections specialist. Answers must be sought
to the following questions: Can successful mental health programs
and treatment methods provide insight for rehabilitation of criminal offenders? Does prison life cause mental illness or extreme
psychological stress in a substantial number of prisoners? If so,
should such confinement be eliminated? What other noninstitu172 In an interview conducted on September 18, 1970, Dr. Ames Robey, Director of the
Center for Forensic Psychiatry, estimated that in 55 to 60 per cent of the cases where a
defendant is sent to the Forensic Center for an evaluation of competency to stand trial, the
prosecutor, defense counsel, or the criminal court is attempting to gain information unrelated to the issue of competency which the Center is not statutorily empowered to provide.
173 SPECIAL COMM. OF THE MICH. STATE BAR FOR THE REVISION OF THE CRIM. CODE,

MICH. REVISED CRIM. CODE 110 (§ 1220 (2)) (Final Draft).
17 4 7The Final Draft of the Revised Criminal Code contains a provision outlining a
procedure to be followed for civil commitment in lieu of sentence. Id. at 112 (§ 1225).
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tional alternatives are potentially available to the convicts; to any
mentally ill person?
D. A ProposedJoint Facility
Recently, the Department of Mental Health and the Department of Corrections have issued a program statement proposing
the construction of a joint mental health-corrections facility.' 75 As
envisioned by the Departments, the facility would contain a
150- 170 bed maximum security hospital, a 50 bed forensic center
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Mental Health, and a
reception-diagnostic unit housing 600-650 newly sentenced prisoners under the jurisdiction of the Deparment of Corrections. The
Departments have suggested locating the new facility on the
76
grounds of the Ypsilanti State Hospital.
While the expressed willingness of the two Departments to
cooperate in this new venture is encouraging, the plan to construct a new physical plant is premature. To date, the Departments have not properly evaluated and adequately treated mentally ill criminal offenders. There is no assurance that a proposed
joint facility would do more than merely house dangerous mental
patients and nonmentally ill convicts under one roof. Use of the
Ionia Center as recommended appears to be a more logical, and
less costly, first step. Successful cooperation there might then
merit a more ambitious undertaking, such as a joint facility.
IX. CONCLUSION

The enactment of new laws will not by itself alter people's
attitudes or end their irrational fears. At most, legislation can only
authorize a desirable course of action by establishing a workable
framework for that action. Whether statutes based on this writer's
recommendations will operate successfully depends upon the
people implementing those statutes-primarily the people within
the Department of Mental Health.
Admittedly, the recommendations here presented were not designed for the administrative convenience of the Department of

175 Letter from Gus Harrison, Director, Department of Corrections and William H.
Anderson, M.D., Director, Department of Mental Health, to Mr. Glenn S. Allen, Jr.,
Executive Assistant, re: Joint Mental Health and Corrections Department Facility,
January 2, 1968. See also DMH-PRELMINARY PROSPECTUS, supra note 28.
176

DMH-PRELIMINARY PROSPECTUS, supra note 28, at 14.
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Mental Health. The goal of the recommendations is adequate and
equal treatment for all of Michigan's mentally ill citizens. While
the specific recommendations are subject to debate and modification, adequate and equal treatment cannot be compromised.
Most assuredly, problems will arise, and difficult decisions will
have to be made. However, if an honest attempt is made to
achieve this goal, the problems will not be insolvable.

